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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AT THE CROSSROAD BETWEEN

MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF
DOMINANT POSITION: AMERICAN
AND EUROPEAN
APPROACHES COMPARED.
EMANUELA AREZZOt

INTRODUCTION
As is very well known, intellectual property rights' throughout the
world have recently experienced a massive expansionist trend. 2 Patent
law has slowly stretched the boundaries of patentable subject matter to
cover DNA sequences, 3 software 4 and business methods, 5 leaving comt Dr. Emanuela Arezzo is Research Fellow in Intellectual Property and Competition
Law at Luiss University, School of Law, Rome, Italy and S.J.D. candidate at Duke Law
School, North Carolina, USA. I would like to thank Professors Gustavo Ghidini, Andreas
Heineman, Jerome Reichman and Hans Ullrich for comments on previous drafts of this
work. I also would like to thank Professors Steve Anderman, Josef Drexl and Rudolf Peritz
for enlightening discussions relating to the intersection of intellectual property rights and
competition law. Any likely error or imprecision is solely attributable to myself.
1. I would like to point out that I have decided to limit this work only to patent and
copyright laws. Therefore, I will not deal with the intersection of IPRs and antitrust with
regard to trademarks.
2. For a complete overview of the American scenario see James Boyle, The Second
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs.
33 (2003); see also Gustavo Ghidini, IntellectualProperty and Competition Law: The Inno-

vation Nexus (Edward Elgar Publisher 2006) (giving a European perspective).
3. The American case opening the way towards the patentability of biotechnological
inventions is Diamond v. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303 (1980) (explaining that the patentability line had to be drawn between natural occurring phenomena and man-made things,
rather than between living and not living things). In Europe, the patentability of biotechnological invention has been expressly codified by the Directive 98/441EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions. EurLex, Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Counsil of
6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, http://europa.eu.intl
smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&numdoc=31998L0044&
model=guicheti&lg=en (accessed Feb. 4, 2007).
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mentators to wonder whether it still makes sense to inquire about what
can and cannot be patented in the first place. 6 Similarly, copyright law
has been expanding in all possible directions: not just new subject matters have been added 7 and new sets of rights created s but the length of
protection has been extended, 9 and even a new set of exclusive rights has
been created to protect technological measures that, in turn, are meant
to protect copyrighted works. 10
Such trends have been strongly backed by a reverse tendency in the
application of antitrust laws towards anticompetitive practices involving
4. The American leading case for the patentability of software is considered In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Europe issued a proposal of a directive on the patentability of computer-related inventions which was presented by the European Commission on February 20th 2002 (doc. COM(2002)92-C5-0082/2002-2002/0047), but the common
position on such proposal has been rejected in second reading by the European Parliament
on July 2005. Notwithstanding this precise legislative veto, it is well known that the European Patent Office has granted patents on computer implemented inventions since the end
of the eighties (Vicom/Computer-Related Invention, T208/84, 1987 E.P.O.R. 74) and it does
not seem willing to stop its trend. For a more extensive description of the European trend of
protection with regard to software see Gustavo Ghidini & Emanuela Arezzo, One, None or a
Hundred Thousand: How Many Layers of Protectionfor Software Innovation? (unpublished
article) (copy on file with the author).
5. See State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998); see also the EPO case PBS Partnership/Controlling pension benefit systems, T931/
95, 2002 E.P.O.R. 52 (giving a European perspective).
6. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Story of Diamond v. Chakrabarty:Technological Change
and the Subject Matter Boundariesof the Patent System, in IntellectualProperty Stories 357
(R.C. Dreyfuss & J.C. Ginsburg eds. Foundation Press 2006).
7. See e.g. American Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see also Council Directive
on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs. EurLex, Council Directive 91/250/EEC of
14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs 42-46, http://europa.eu.int/
smartapicgi/sga-doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&numdoc=31991L0250&
model=guichett&lg=en (accessed Feb. 4, 2007).
8. Think, for example, to the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, (so called Rome Convention), in Rome on October 26, 1961.
9. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (extending copyright protection for works created on or after January 1, 1978
for a term of the life of the author plus 70 years following the author's death). In Europe,
the same result has been achieved. , EurLex, Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October
1993 p.9, http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc
&numdoc=31993LOO98&model=guichett&lg=en (accessed Feb. 4, 2007) (harmonizing the
term of protection of copyright and certain related rights),
10. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
As far as Europe is concerned see articles 6 and 7 of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of
copyright and related rights in the information society. EurLex, Directive 2001/29/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 10-19, http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/20011_167/l16720010622en00100019.pdf (accessed Feb. 4, 2007).
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intangible monopolies." After a period of hostility when antitrust laws,
both in U.S. and E.U., severely constrained IP-owners' licensing practices and unilateral behaviors, 12 the wind changed again toward a more
pro-IP attitude. 13 This new approach has played a central role in
to obtain a
strengthening IP-owners' exclusive rights by allowing them
14
far greater monopoly than the one they were entitled to.
Despite the major commonalities of approaches taken by United
States and Europe, it is important to point out that some discrepancies
have occurred with regard to the way the two systems have assessed anticompetitive behaviors endorsed by dominant firms whose position of
strength stems, in great part, from intellectual property rights. Indeed,
as I will show in this study, American antitrust treatment of refusal to
deal with cases has created a de facto immunity from antitrust intervention for unilateral conduct of dominant undertaking holding intellectual
assets. Conversely, European antitrust law has endorsed a more restrictive attitude, holding that when exceptional circumstances do exist, the
exclusive faculty of the IP-owner can be curtailed in favor of a more competitive structure of the market. As I will explain, the reasons for these
discrepancies can be also traced back to more general differences of
American and European assessment of anticompetitive unilateral
conduct.
This study is divided into three sections. The first section will be
devoted to a comparative study of American and European antitrust provisions dealing with unilateral exclusionary conduct. Here it will be explained that although section 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 82 of the
EC Treaty seem to share several commonalities, many significant differences do exist regarding both the normative framework and the practical
assessment of the cases. The second part will be specifically concerned
with the analysis of American and European cases involving the inter11. Note that in the United States this trend has been somewhat accelerated by the
fact that many cases at the intersection between competition law and IPRs come under
competence of the Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit, the ad hoc Appellate Court for
patent cases, which has often been blamed for its over-protectionist attitude towards patents. For a critical overview on the role of CAFC within the patent system, see Arti K. Rai,
EngagingFacts and Policy: A Multi-InstitutionalApproach To Patent System Reform, 103
Colum. L. Rev. 1035 (2003).
12. For a reconstruction of these trends in the United States see R. Hewitt Pate, Refusals to Deal and Intellectual PropertyRights, 10 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 429 (2002); see also
Rochelle Dreyfuss, Unique Works / Unique Challenges at the Intellectual Property/ Competition Law Interface (Hart Publishing 2006). Similarly, the seventies in Europe were characterized by a generalized hostility towards IPRs, merely perceived as an instrument to
partitioning the market. Valentine Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual Property and
Antitrust: The European Experience, 69 Antitrust L. J. 805 (2001).
13. Hanns Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist
Competition Rules, 7 J. Int'l Econ. L. 401 (2004).
14. On this specific point see infra chapter III.1.
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section between intellectual property rights and antitrust law. The third
and last part will comment on the economic significance of intellectual
property rights, and thus on the proper weight they should be afforded in
an antitrust analysis.
I. THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK: SECTION 2 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT AND ARTICLE 82 OF THE EC TREATY
As mentioned, this contribution is meant to analyze how American
and European antitrust laws have approached the issue of intellectual
property and, specifically, to confront different attitudes shown toward
unilateral behaviors of companies whose dominant positions can be attributed, inter alia, to the ownership of an intangible asset. In order to do
that, it is significant to analyze how American and European antitrust
laws differ in the treatment of exclusionary behaviors in the first place.
As is well known, the meaning of the word "monopolize" has been
the subject of much discussion since the very issuance of the Sherman
Act. 15 Because the lure of monopoly profits represent the ultimate goal
every firm tends to, it is easy to understand the skepticism that has surrounded Section 2 of the Sherman Act whose strict interpretation would
allegedly risk punishing even companies that have acquired market
power through legitimate means (so called competition on the merit).
This tension has been recognized since the very early days of American
antitrust history when the Supreme Court clarified that "the law does
not make mere size an offense or the existence of unexerted power an
offense." 16 In a statement later confirmed in the famous Alcoa case,
Judge Hand held that "the successful competitor, having been urged to
17
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins."
The difficulties in distinguishing competition on the merits from
mere anticompetitive conduct are substantial, even more in the case of
unilateral exclusionary behaviors. Unilateral behaviors adopted by dominant firms are called exclusionary because they aim at discouraging potential rivals' entry into the relevant market or, conversely, they intend
to gradually drive existing competitors off the market. In other words,
exclusionary conduct is directly aimed at competitors, and only by damaging the latter does it cause a lessening of competition that ultimately
damages consumers. Because there is a widespread consensus today, especially well rooted in the United States, that antitrust law must be intended as a "consumer welfare prescription". z8 The fact that
15. Eleanor M. Fox, Is There Life in Aspen After Trinko? The Silent Revolution of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 73 Antitrust L.J. 153 (2005).
16. U.S. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
17. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir 1945).
18. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 194-95 (2d ed. 2001).
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exclusionary conduct does not always lead to a straightforward lessening
of consumer welfare makes the overall assessment of the anticompetitive
character of the conduct more complex. 19 In particular, because the ultimate effects of the conduct on consumers is not always immediate meaning that, as result of the conduct, consumers may not immediately
bear a higher price or will not face a sudden shortening of quantities there is a sensible risk that the anticompetitive harm stemming from
20
exclusionary conduct may be underestimated.
The debate about the proper assessment of unilateral exclusionary
conduct is very much discussed today both in United States 2 1 and in Europe. 22 Although it is not the topic of this specific study, I will address it
from time to time with regard to refusal to deal with cases and the anti19. The idea the antitrust law, especially with regard to unilateral conduct, should be
exclusively aimed at pursuing consumer welfare is still foreign to European antitrust law,
although the recent debate on the reform of Article 82 has seen some scholars strongly
proposing this view. In particular see Patrick Rey, Jordi Gual, Martin Hellwig, Anne Perrot, Michele Polo, Klaus Schmidt & Rune Stenbacka, Report by the EAGCP, An economic
approach to Article 82, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/studies/eagcpjuly_21_05.pdf (accessed Apr. 4, 2007).
20. In fact, unilateral exclusionary conduct often results in raising rival costs' strategy.
This means that the conduct is not aimed at causing (and therefore it does not cause) rivals'
immediate exit off the market, but rather it intends to weaken rivals' position on the market so that they will not be able to offset dominant firm's anticompetitive conduct. In such a
scenario, the short-term effect of the anticompetitive conduct will be a lessening of competition in the market; such situation in the long run will cause the actual exit of weakened
competitors which will progressively lose market share to the monopolist. See Thomas G.
Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande & Steven C. Salop, Monopoly Power and Market Power in
Antitrust Law, 76 Geo. L.J. 241 (1987) (addressing more extensively the issue on raising
rivals' costs as manifestation of exclusionary market power); see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve
Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986).
21. Just to mention some of the most relevant voices in the debate, see Mark R. Patterson, The Sacrifice of Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L.R. 256 (2003); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 147 (2005); Richard A.
Epstein, Monopoly Dominance or Level Playing Field? The New Antitrust Paradox, 72 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 49 (2005); A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct under the Antitrust
Laws: Balancing,Sacrifice, and Refusal to Deal, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1247 (2005); Eleanor M. Fox, Is There Life in Aspen After Trinko? The Silent Revolution of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 73 Antitrust L.J. 153 (2005); Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary
Conduct Under Section 2: The "No Economic Sense" Test, 73 Antitrust L.J. 413 (2006);
Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 Antitrust L.J. 311 (2006).
22. The European Commission has recently engaged in a review process of exclusionary abuses under Article 82 EC Treaty. To this purpose, the Commission has released a
Discussion Paper which has been published on the Commission website and has been
asked for comments. At the beginning of 2007, the commission is expected to clear its position and frame an official document that will probably reshape to some extent the current
assessment of unilateral conduct under the abuse doctrine. European Commission, DG
Competition discussion paper on the applicationof Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary
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trust treatment of exclusionary behaviors involving intellectual property
rights.
1.

MONOPOLIZATION AND ATTEMPT TO MONOPOLIZE UNDER U.S.
ANTITRUST LAW

Section 2 of the Sherman Act punishes, with a fine or by imprisonment or both, "every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with another person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States." 23 The most important thing to keep in mind about section 2 of
the Sherman Act is that it is meant to punish two different types of behaviors (that can be pursued by one or more undertakings): monopolization and the attempt to monopolize.
As far as the mere monopolization claim is concerned, the jurisprudence has recently clarified that "the offense of monopoly under § 2 of the
Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in
the relevant market, 24 and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of
the power as distinguished from growth or development as a conse25
quence of a superior product, business acumen or historic accident."
While mere possession of monopoly power is not sufficient per se to trigger section 2 monopolization claims, it is a necessary precondition because monopolization can be described as the conduct of a firm that
already has a position of strength on the market and adopts anticompetitive exclusionary strategies to the ultimate goal of preserving such posi6
tion or further enlarging it.2
Attempt to monopolize differs from monopolization because it regards conduct of a company that aims at achieving monopoly power in a
certain market. Understandably, attempt to monopolization claims present an even harder case than mere monopolization because every firm
tends to achieve a position of strength in the market. Therefore, in theory, each conduct could be characterized as an attempt to monopolize.
This surely explains why American jurisprudence has crafted a someabuses, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competitionlantitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf (accessed
Apr. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Discussion Paper].
23. 15 U.S.C.S. § 2 (2007).
24. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 (1985) (defining market power as "the power to control prices in the relevant market or to exclude competition in a relevant market."); IntergraphCorp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (stating, "anticompetitive conduct is generally defined as conduct whose purpose
is to acquire or preserve the power to control prices or exclude competition."). Conversely,
monopoly power is generally intended as substantialmarket power. Herbert Hovenkamp,
FederalAntitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice269 (2d ed., West 1999).
25. U.S. v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); see also Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at
595-96.
26. Hovenkamp, supra n. 24, at 274.
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what more complex test for attempt cases, establishing that liability is
found when there is proof of: 1) a predatory or anticompetitive conduct,
2) a specific intent to monopolize and 3) a dangerous probability of
27
success.
The first and the second elements are closely related in that intent is
often inferred by the type of conduct adopted by the firm as well as the
strategies chosen to implement it. 28 It is important to point out that,
unlike general monopolization cases, attempt to monopolize cases require a 'stronger' proof of intent. 2 9 The reason for this can be easily understood. Because each competitor aims at winning the game of
competition, a mere intent to exclude competitors, usually present in
most section 2 cases, is not deemed enough for attempt cases. 30 The
range of conduct that might constitute attempts to monopolize is quite
broad. In this regard it is interesting to note that the word anticompetitive in the case of attempt to monopolize has been broadly interpreted by
the jurisprudence in such a way to comprehend also unfair practices. 3 1
The third requirement of the test - the dangerous probability of success - relies on structural factors: namely, market shares, number of
competitors, barriers to entry and all other elements determining the degree of market power already held by the firm attempting to obtain monopoly power. Clearly, the stronger the power already detained by the
firm, the bigger the chances that it will succeed in obtaining monopoly
power, hence the more dangerous the conduct. It is interesting to note
that until recently there was disagreement among the Court with regard
27. This test has been first inferred from the case Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375, 396 (1905), and it has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 1985 in Spectrum
Sports Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 457 (1993).
28. It is generally accepted that intent can be proved through both direct and indirect
evidences, for the most part found in firms' actions. Edward T. Sullivan & Jeffrey L. Harrison, UnderstandingAntitrust and its Economic Implications, Understanding Series, 305
(LexisNexis 2003).
29. See Times-Picayune v. U.S., 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953) (clarifying that "While the
completed offense of monopolization under § 2 demands only a general intent to do the act,
'for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing,' a specific intent to destroy
competition or build monopoly is essential to guilt for the mere attempt") (emphasis added).
This holding has been confirmed in later judgments. See e.g. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, 148
F.2d at 432; Smith v. N. Michigan Hosp. Inc., 703 F.2d 942, 954 (6th Cir. 1983); Tops Markets, Inc. v. Quality Markets, Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 1998).
30. Sullivan, supra n. 28, at 304.
31. Note, indeed, that the category of attempts to monopolize seems to include also
conducts like false advertising, industrial espionage, disparagement of a competitor's product and other unlawful behaviors. Sullivan, supra n. 28, at 311; see e.g. Aldridge v.
Microsoft Corp., 995 F. Supp. 728, 740 (S.D. Tex. 1998) Aldrigde sued Microsoft, inter alia,
for violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act for actual and attempted monopolization relying on the doctrine of product disparagement and essential facility. Id. It is interesting to
point out that such practices in Europe are generally banned by unfair competition laws.
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to whether market power mattered at all in an attempt to monopolize
claims. 3 2 Nowadays, such disagreement has been settled. Indeed, commentators explain that market power assessment has a fundamental
role in attempt claims. If too much focus were to be placed on the unfairness of the conduct and too little on market power, the offense would
33
operate to protect inefficient businesses from more efficient rivals.

2.

ABUSES OF DOMINANT POSITION IN

EU

ANTITRUST LAW

Article 82 of the EC Treaty expressly establishes that "any abuse by
one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States." 34 The article provides a list of examples of abusive conduct, 35 but EC founders purposefully left open both the concept of
dominance and of abuse which have been elaborated upon by European
Courts.
EU case law has adopted a rather comprehensive definition of dominance. A dominant position has been defined as a situation where a company detains such a position of strength on a certain market that it can
make its own business strategy and decision without taking into consideration how competitors and customers will react and how consumers
will be ultimately affected by it. In addition, dominance has been de32. Departing from the trends commonly accepted in other Circuits, the Ninth Circuit
used to hold that evidence of the relevant market or of the firm's market power was not
necessary to reach the level of "dangerous probability" whose analysis rested solely on the
anticompetitiveness of the behavior. According to the Ninth Circuit, only if there were not
sufficient evidences to prove the unfair or predatory conduct was it necessary to show defendant's market power. See Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). The Supreme Court, on certiorari, clarified that proof of "dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power" rests on considerations of the relevant
market and the defendant's ability to lessen or destroy competition in that market. Spectrum Sports Inc., 506 U.S. at 456.
33. Hovenkamp, supra n.24, at 279.
34. European Commission, Article 82 of the EC Treaty,, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art82_en.html (accessed Apr. 4, 2007) [hereinafter EC
Treaty or Treaty].
35. Art. 82 EC Treaty explains that an abuse may consist in: "(a) directly or indirectly
imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting
production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing
them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts." Id.
In Continental Can, the European Court of Justice made it clear that the list contained in
Article 82 is merely exemplificative and does not provide "an exhaustive enumeration of
the sort of abuses of a dominant position prohibited by the Treaty." EuropemballageCorp.
and Continental Can Co. Inc. v. Commission [1973] ECR 215 at para. 26.
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scribed as the power to prevent effective competition being maintained in
36
the relevant market.
According to some commentators, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) has purposefully linked the power to prevent the maintenance of a
competitive asset in the market to the power to behave independently, as
if the former can only occur if the latter has been found. 3 7 This assumption seems reasonable because the concept of independence has often
been referred to as the special feature of dominance. 38 Nonetheless,
some other commentators (usually economists) prefer the part of the definition that describes dominance as the power to prevent effective competition being maintained, as this may seem more closely related to the
39
economic concept of market power.
Although it has become common, even in the language of the Commission, to talk about undertakings' market power as synonym of a position of strength in a certain market, the concept of dominance-at least
until now 40 - is more comprehensive than market power as it goes far
36. "The dominant position thus referred to relate to a position of economic strength
enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent
independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consumers". See
United Brands Company and United Brands ContinentaalBV v. Commission of the European Communities, case 27/76, [1978] ECR 207, para. 65; Hoffman - La Roche v. Commission of the European Communities, case 85/76, [1979] ECR 461, para. 38.
37. See Thomas Eilmansberger, Dominance-The Lost Child? How Effects-Based Rules
Could and Should Change Dominance Analysis, 2 European Competition Journal 15, special issue (2006). Although, for the sake of preciseness, Eilmansberger thinks this link is
inappropriate as the power to behave independently would be causally linked to the power
to prevent effective competition being maintained only in the case of leveraging practices
and not for the remaining unilateral conduct.
38. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, [1979] ECR 1-461, paras 42-48.
39. Damien Geradin, Paul Hofer, Frederic Louis, Nicolas Petit & Mike Walker, The
Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law, http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=770144 (accessed Feb. 5, 2005). These commentators have argued that the definition of dominance as power to behave independently is somewhat vague and economically
incorrect because all undertakings, even near-monopolists, face a downward sloping demand curve and the pressure of competition from substitute products or services. This
clearly shows how economists are often incapable to grasp flexibilities inherent in words
such as "to an appreciable extent". In fact, the ECJ has never described this peculiar freedom of action as absolute. Rather, the ECJ has explained that dominance enables the undertaking "if not to determine, to have an appreciable influence on the conditions under
which competition will develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it so long as
such conduct does not operate to its detriment". Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission at 39.
40. In its Discussion Paper [see supra n. 22] the Commission presents dominance as
the equivalent to substantialmarket power [Discussion Paper, IT 23, 28]. The weight to be
given to such a proposition is uncertain because the whole discussion paper has an ambiguous tone and the Commission seems torn between the intention to confirm well settled EU
case law and the desire to introduce some changes towards a new assessment of exclusionary practices. For an more detailed discussion on the differences between dominance and
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beyond the mere power over prices. 4 1 Assessment of a position of dominance indeed takes into account a vast array of factors which can range
from the exclusive possession of crucial inputs, to ownership of intellectual assets and many others. 4 2 Moreover, the assessment of dominance
is aimed at evaluating the overall commercial and economic position a
certain undertaking has on a certain market vis-h-vis its competitors,
43
but it does so without inquiring upon the conduct pursued by the firm.
European bodies have stressed that the mere existence of a dominant position does not exclude tout court a certain amount of competition
as it would happen in case of monopoly. 4 4 Rather, dominance is defined
as a situation whereby normal competitive forces playing in a certain
45
market are sensibly weakened.
The EC case law has explained that the concept of abuse is an objective notion which is connected to dominance and it is distinct from it at
the same time. It is linked to dominance in the sense that without domimarket power, and their role in the European Commission's Discussion Paper see
Emanuela Arezzo, Is there a role for market definition and dominance in an effects-based
approach?, contribution presented at the Max Planck Forum on Competition Law on "Article 82 EC: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms?", Max Planck Institute for
Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Munich, Germany (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=964199.
41. In this sense see Giorgio Monti, The Concept of Dominance in Article 82, 2 European Competition Journal, 31, special issue (2006). Following the discussion on the reform
of Article 82, many scholars have expressed their view on how the concept of dominance
should be properly framed. Among the most relevant contributions, see Duncan Sinclair,
Abuse of Dominance at a Crossroads- PotentialEffect, Object and Appreaciability under
Article 82 EC, 25(8) E.C.L.R. 491 (2004); Thomas Eilmansberger, supra n. 37; Peter Oliver,
The Concept of'Abuse' of a Dominant Position UnderArticle 82 EC: Recent Developments in
Relation to Pricing, 26 European Competition J. 315 (2005); Gunnar Niels & Helen Jenkins, Reform of Article 82: Where the Link between Dominance and Effects Breaks Down,
26(11) E.C.L.R. 605 (2005);Adrian Majumdar, Whither Dominance, 27(4) E.C.L.R. 161
(2006).
42. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, [1979] ECR 1-461, 41 (explaining that dominance was not merely given by a market share analysis; rather assessment of dominance
required a balance of the finding of high market shares with other relevant economic factors such as the time dimension, the volume of production and the scale of supply).
43. Because market power is measured through price increases, it is often inferred by
the very same conduct adopted by the firm. See Arezzo, supra n. 40.
44. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, [1979] ECR 1-461, 39.
45. In this regard, see the definition that Advocate General Konott gives of the scope of
Article 82 and dominance in BritishAirlines v. Commission: "article 82, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is not designed only or primarily to protect the immediate
interests of individual competitors or consumers, but to protect the structure of the market
and thus competition as such (as an institution), which has already been weakened by the
presence of the dominant undertaking on the market" (emphasis in the original). British
Airways v. Commission, Case C-95/04,, 69 (Feb. 2006).
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nance the behavior would not be punished. 4 6 But it is distinct because
the abuse amounts to a separate moment. The abuse takes place when
competition on the market has already been distorted by the presence of
the dominant position and it is punished expressly because it further dis47
rupts this scenario by means different from competition on the merits.

3.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ARTICLE
AND SECTION

2

82 EC

TREATY

OF THE SHERMAN ACT

Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Section 2 of the Sherman Act are
often regarded as similar provisions in that they are both meant to prohibit unilateral conduct which influences a certain market, and have the
effect of impairing trade between member States. In both cases the conduct becomes relevant when a certain degree of economic power is involved and in both cases the conduct, although generally adopted by a
single undertaking, can also be pursued by more than one firm. Nonetheless, despite these apparent commonalities, several differences can be
traced among the two provisions.
A first relevant difference can be found in that, as I hinted above,
European competition laws do not punish conduct aimed at obtaining a
dominant position. A finding of dominance is the fundamental prong for
assessing unilateral abuses; therefore, whatever the means and the
strategies implied to achieve it, the mere attainment of a position of dominance in itself will not punished. Only the abuse of such position can
trigger liability under article 82:48 hence, no attempt claims can be pursued in Europe; 49 not even in the case that clear evidence is provided
46. This is because the rationale of the overall architecture of EC antitrust law is that
the stronger the position held by the firms in a certain market, the more dangerous will be
the conduct for competition.
47. In the famous Hoffmann-La Roche judgement, the ECJ explained that: "The concept of an abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a
dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result
of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened
and which, through recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators,
has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the
market or the growth of that competition. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, [19791 ECR
461, 91. Similarly, NV Nederlandsche Banden-IndustrieMichelin v. Commission, [1983]
ECR 3461 T 70.
48. The provision rests on the assumption that the very same conduct can or cannot be
anticompetitive depending on who engages in it because the stronger the position the firm
holds in the market, the stronger the effect of her behavior and the greater are the chances
that her conduct is going to deeply affect the market structure.
49. Although it might be argued that, because a position of dominance has been found
even when the undertaking has low market shares, the European abuse doctrine could be
broad enough to comprehend practices that, under American law, would be assessed as
attempt claims.
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that the company has engaged in the practice with the specific intent to
damage a competitor or competition in general. Indeed, a second substantive difference between the two doctrines is given by the fact that
European assessment of unilateral conduct does not take intent into
account. 50
Another significant difference with regard to the assessment of
abuse and monopolization (or attempt to monopolize) can be found in the
defensive tools dominant firms have at their own disposal once their conduct has been found abusive.. Under Article 82 EC Treaty, the firm can
defend itself insofar as it can demonstrate that it has taken "reasonable
steps as it deems appropriate to protect its interests, provided however
that the purpose of such behavior is not to strengthen this dominant position and abuse it" (emphasis added) 51 . Also, a firm might justify its conduct asserting that it has been forced to undertake such behavior in
order to minimize the losses it would suffer from rivals' competition (so
called "meeting competition defense"). 52 Conversely, under American antitrust law, dominant firms can defend themselves by simply asserting
that their conduct is likely to pass efficiencies on consumers and that a
balancing of the pro- and anti-competitive effects caused by the practice
shows that the latter does not have the ultimate effect of harming
consumers.
This is surely a substantive divergence of approach. The European
concept of 'objective justification' appears as a limited defensive instrument whereby the undertaking claims that the conduct was not abusive
because it only engaged into the conduct to defend its own business.5 3 On
50. As clarified by the ECJ, the concept of abuse is an objective concept and, as a general rule, its assessment is not made dependent on evaluation upon intent of the dominant
undertaking. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461, 91; CompagnieMaritime Beige Transportsand others v. Commission, [1996] ECR 11-1201, 149. For the sake of
preciseness, proof of intent has only been taken into account in a predatory pricing case
(Akzo Chemie BV v. Commission, case C-62/86, ECR 1991, 1-3359) but this is not likely to
be the rule. Conversely, intent will usually be taken into account to determine the proper
amount of the fine. See Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to
Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation no. 1/2003, O.J. C 210, p. 2-5,
1 and 4.
This is also likely a big difference between American and European Intellectual Property
Laws. American statutory norms used to put great emphasis on intent to prove that conduct is anticompetitive or that a competitor was willing to infringe the patent or the copyright (think about the inducement theory in patent law, recently introduced into copyright
law by the Supreme Court decision in Grokster.Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005)).
51. Atlantic ContainerLine AB and Others v. Commission, Joined cases T-191/98, T212/98 to T-214/98, [2003] ECR 11-3275, 1 1113.
52. European Commission Discussion Paper, supra n. 22 at
81-83.
53. The objective justification defense is not easy to assert. The ECJ has often explained that undertakings do not have an unconstrained right to protect their commercial
interests; rather, their defensive actions must be proportionate to the desired goal and not
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the contrary, the American approach seems more like an affirmative instrument aimed at showing the overall pro-competitive character of the
behavior. This difference is clearly stated by the wording of the Court of
First Instance explaining that companies cannot justify their conduct on
the basis that they bring about certain advantages for themselves or for
54
consumers.
Recently, the European Commission seems to have endorsed a somewhat smoother approach towards so called efficiency defense by asserting
that exclusionary conduct may escape the prohibition of art. 82 if the
dominant undertaking can demonstrate that its conduct produces efficiencies that outweigh the negative impact on competition. However,
while the position of the Commission is not definitive as yet, 55 it should
be pointed out that the European defense based on efficiency seems rea56
sonably narrower in scope than its American counterpart.
Eventually, the last but not least, a significant difference stems from
the very same assessment of dominance and the concept of anticompetitive conduct.
As I have mentioned above, American antitrust law has evolved
more and more towards the idea of antitrust as a "consumer welfare prescription". 57 This view has led courts to specifically concentrate on conduct whose effect directly restrains output or increases price, to the
immediate detriment of consumers, and to disregard practices that do
not directly cause such an effect not distorting of competitive equilibresult in conduct that strengthen or abuse of a dominant position. United Brands Company
and United Brands ContinentaalBV v. Commission of the EuropeanCommunities, case 27/
76, [1978] ECR 207,
189-190. This probably explains that fact that dominant firms usually plead their case arguing that they do not hold a position of dominance in the first place
or that the relevant market has not been properly defined.
54. "The sole purpose of those grounds ofjustification is to enable dominant undertakings to show not that the practices in question should be permitted because they confer certain advantages, but only that the purpose of those practices is reasonably to protect its
commercial interest in the face of action taken by certain third parties and they do not
therefore in fact constitute an abuse" (emphasis added). Atlantic Container Line AB and
Others v. Commission, Joined cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214198, [2003] ECR 11-3275, 91
1114.
55. Please note that by the time this contribution was completed, the European Commission had not clarified whether it was going to amend the Discussion Paper and in which
direction.
56. In fact, the efficiency defense, as framed by the European Commission in its Discussion Paper, presents a four-prong test which is not easy to comply with. Accordingly, the
dominant company has to prove that: a) the allegedly abusive conduct has realized or is
likely to realize efficiencies; b) the conduct is indispensable to produce such efficiencies; c)
the efficiencies benefit consumers; d) competition in a substantial part of the products concerned is not eliminated. European Commission Discussion Paper, supra n. 22, 91 84-92
57. Posner, supra n. 18, at 194-95.
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ria. 58 Although actual proof of consumer welfare diminution is not expressly required by the Sherman Act nor by other statutory provisions,
an exclusionary conduct will not be punished lacking clear evidence of
consumer harm. As a consequence, the concept of anticompetitive conduct entirely reverts to whether the conduct harms consumers, in the
sense that it actually diminishes consumer welfare.
On the contrary, European competition bodies have always regarded
consumers welfare as one important goal of competition policy; however,
they have shown equal concerns towards the protection and safeguard of
competitive structures of markets and openness. 5 9 More specifically,
while the Commission explains that the protection of competition on the
market is ultimately intended at enhancing consumer welfare, 60 it has
been clearly stated that competition as an institution must be considered
the direct goal of competition rules. 6 1 This substantial divergence regarding the policy goals of antitrust law bears a significant impact on the
practical assessment of anticompetitive conduct in general and - with
regard to the topic of this study-exclusionary unilateral conduct. In
fact, European antitrust law does not require evidence of consumer welfare as further element to prove the abuse. 62 Rather, consumers damage
58. Eleanor M. Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 70 Antitrust L.J. 371 (2002).
59. Openness and access to essential inputs are values carefully cherished by the European Commission. See, for example, Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Applicability
of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, OJ C 3 [2001], where
the Commission (talking about standards and standardization agreements) states that
where a de facto industry standard emerges, "the main concern will then be to ensure that
these standards are as open as possible and applied in a clear non-discriminatory manner.
To avoid elimination of competition in the relevant market(s), access to the standard must
be possible for third parties on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms." Id.at T1.
6.4.3, 174. Such an approach of the Commission and the superior European Courts finds its
roots in the ordoliberal school of thought, of German origin. The members of the Freeburg
school saw competition law as guarantor of undertakings' freedom of action in a scenario of
open market structures governed by complete competition. The core principles and ideas of
the ordoliberal school can be found in: David Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth
Century Europe, (Oxford, 2001), chapter VII, and Walter Eucken, The Competitive Order
and Its Implementation, (1949), English translation reprinted in 2 Competition Policy International 219 (2006).
60. European Commission Discussion Paper, supra n. 22,
4 and 54. See also the
words of the ECJ in the Continental Can case where it clarified that Article 82: "[...]
is not
only aimed at practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those
which are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure,
such as is mentioned in Article 3 (F) of the Treaty." Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v, Commission, case 6-72 [1973] E.C.R. 00215, para. 26.
61. See again the words of Advocate General Konott quoted supra n. 45.
62. Although there is currently a group of European economists who strongly argue
that European assessment of abuse of dominance should move towards the American approach and only declare anticompetitive a conduct that causes an immediate consumer
welfare diminution. See Rey et al., supra n. 19.
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is presumed whenever the distortion of competition, already caused by
the very same presence of the dominant firm on the market, is brought
63
one step further by the abusive conduct.
The protection of competitive structure of the market as a value in
itself to grant all undertakings the chance and the freedom to compete is
also coherent with the so called "special responsibility" principle, according to which dominant firms, because of their peculiar position of
strength in the relevant market, are precluded from engaging in behaviors often allowed to their smaller competitors. 6 4 The special responsibility principle has surely been a determinant for the ECJ and the
Commission in its refusal to deal with cases where the courts have often
affirmed that dominant companies have a duty to deal and or supply
with small competitors. Although such a principle has never existed in
American antitrust law, I will examine how American jurisprudence in
the past twenty years has gradually cut back on refusal to deal cases,
65
especially when such conduct involves intellectual property rights.
4.

FRAMING THE ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT: ARTICLE

SECTION 1 AND SECTION

2

82 EC

TREATY V.

OF THE SHERMAN ACT

The way American and European bodies frame anticompetitive conduct is probably one of the most sensible differences in comparative antitrust law. As anticipated, the European abuse of dominant provision
codifies a tentative list of anticompetitive conduct that falls under the
category of abuse. Although, as said, the list is not exhaustive, when
evaluating an allegedly anticompetitive practice, European competition
agencies generally try to see whether it falls under one of the specified
category of abuses. 66 On the contrary, this attitude does not seem to per63. Arezzo, supra n. 40.
64. The concept of a special responsibility of dominant firms was first introduced by
the ECJ in Michelin v. Commission where it held that: "[...] the undertaking concerned
has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impairgenuine undistorted competition on the common market" (emphasis added). NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie
Michelin v. Commission, [19831 ECR 3461, 57. After that, the special responsibility principle was often confirmed: see CompagnieMaritime Belge TransportsSA (C-395/96 P) and
Dafra-Lines A/S (C-396/96 P) v. Commission, [2000] ECR 1-01365, 37.
65. See infra chapter II how the Supreme Court in the case Verizon v. Trinko cut back
on the duty to deal holding of the Aspen Skiing case.
66. This attitude of European antitrust enforcers has attracted several criticisms as it
would lead towards undue attention over form rather than substance, i.e. the actual anticompetitive effects caused by the practice, and it would favour some sort of"conduct shopping" whereby undertakings would choose the conduct they deem are more unlikely to
attract antitrust scrutiny. See Rey et al., supra n. 19. Although appealing at a first glance,
these allegations are not correct.
As mentioned earlier, the list of abusive conduct contained at Article 82 is merely exemplificative and the Commission has shown many times that it has the discretion of finding
an abusive conduct outside the realm of the ones expressly codified. A last important exam-
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meate American antitrust law, where both Section 1 and Section 2 of the
Sherman Act do not provide any tentative list of anticompetitive practices and merely set two big frameworks under which anticompetitive
conduct might fall.
As a general tendency, modern American antitrust law does not
seem concerned about framing conduct in order to fit within specific categories of anticompetitive behaviors. Rather, it seems more interested in
finding when the conduct brings about an anticompetitive effect on the
market. 6 7 It is not clear, however, whether this actually represents a
substantive difference between the two antitrust frameworks. In fact,
even under American antitrust law, certain specific types of conduct
have been codified by statutory provisions and have been specifically developed through the case law. 68 In this regard, it is important to not to
forget that in the European Union many member States are civil law
countries where precedents do not have the same weight legislation has.
Therefore, although competition law is surely one branch of the law
where jurisprudence (especially EC jurisprudence) has a substantive
weight (as source of law), the need to have some conduct codified in statutory provisions is surely stronger than in U.S.A.
In the following parts of this chapter, I will concentrate my attention
specifically on how the two antitrust systems have approached and
framed refusals to deal. I will analyze them separately.
4.1.

Framingrefusals to deal in American and European antitrust
law

Broadly speaking, refusals to deal involve the conduct of a company
that has exclusive control over a scarce resource, no matter whether tangible or intangible, or an infrastructure whose access is indispensable to
compete in a certain market or in a separate but closely related market.
The undertaking takes advantage of such strategic position and employs
ple of this practice is given by the recent Astrazeneca decision where the Commission found
the undertaking liable under Article 82 because it has engaged in certain conduct (i.e. a
pattern of misleading representation before several patent offices and national courts and a
request concerning the surrender of market authorizations for Losec capsules in certain
Member States) in order to impede competition from generic drugs and impede parallel
imports of drugs directly competing with the one produced by Astrazeneca. Cf Astrazeneca,
[2005] case COMP/A. 37.507/F3.
67. Spectrum Sport Inc., 506 U.S. 447 (noting that the jury had initially ruled for a
violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act without specifying whether the allegedly anticompetitive conduct fell within a monopolization or attempt to monopolize a claim, not to mention a
more specific kind of monopolization behavior within one of the two).
68. For example, price discrimination, or tying, can also be invoked, respectively,
through recourse to §. 2 or 3 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.§ 13, § 14) and each of these
practice has been specifically developed through the case law.
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it in order to preserve or strengthen its dominant position in that market
or to acquire it in the second-related market.
American and European approaches towards refusals to deal differ
with regard to both the normative framework and the practical assessment of the cases. American antitrust assessment of refusals to deal
comes under section 2 of the Sherman Act as either monopolization or
attempt to monopolize. It is widely acknowledged that a dominant firm's
unilateral refusal to deal with a competitor may constitute prima facie
evidence of exclusionary conduct when the refusal harms the competitive
process. 6 9 Generally, harm to competition is presumed when the behavior causes a reduction in output and an increase in price in the relevant
market, or by a decrease in overall efficiency level in the market that
impacts negatively on consumers. 70 Where proof of harm to the competitive process is given, the dominant firm may rebut the presumption by
71
establishing valid business justification for its conduct.
American antitrust treatment of monopolization cases in generaland refusal to deal cases in particular - tends to focus its attention exclusively on the market where the conduct under analysis displays its effects. 7 2 This means that the monopolization claim under section 2 will be
framed (as monopolization or attempt to monopolize) pursuant to the degree of market power held by the company in the market that will be
ultimately affected by the anticompetitive conduct.
If an undertaking has exclusive control on a certain infrastructure
which is necessary to provide a certain service (but does not represent a
market in itself) and such undertaking denies access to the infrastructure to its competitors, the conduct will be framed as a monopolization
case or as an attempt to monopolize depending on the level of market
power held by the undertaking (thanks to the exclusive control on the
facility) on the service market. 7 3 However, it often happens, in refusal to
deal cases, that the undertaking involved is active in two market segments and that the allegedly exclusionary behavior is aimed at monopolizing a distinct market where the undertaking has not a position of
dominance. The most common example regards an undertaking producing both printer machines and compatible cartridges that engage in exclusionary conduct regarding the cartridge market where it does not
69. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
70. Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1097 (1st Cir. 1994).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
72. Spectrum Sports Inc., 506 U.S. at 460 ("demonstrating the dangerous probability of
monopolization in an attempt case also requires inquiry into the relevant product and geographic market and the defendant's economic power in that market.").
73. As it happened in the Aspen skiing case where a ski company owned three out of
four skiing facilities in the Aspen Mountain and it employed its advantaged position to
drive its only competitor off the market. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585.
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have (a substantive degree of) market power. 74 Such conduct is often
shaped as an attempt to monopolize. 75 It can happen, nonetheless, that
the company has a good degree of monopoly power in the very same (repair) market because, for example, it owns a (copyrighted) diagnostic
software designed to pursue repair and maintenance services of a specific brand of personal computers or that the company is the sole owner
of the relevant facilities to provide certain services. In such cases, the
refusal might be framed as a monopolization claim. 76 In any case, no
matter whether the refusal is framed as monopolization or attempt to
monopolize, the focus of antitrust authorities is always towards the market where the anticompetitive conduct is going to display its effects.
European antitrust law proceeds in a different way. As explained
earlier on in this study, because refusals to deal cases are assessed as
abuse of dominant position under art. 82, the conduct can only be punished if the undertaking is found to be dominant in the first place. The
necessary precondition of finding dominance before further inquiring on
the abusive conduct is of crucial importance for the overall abuse doctrine and for refusal to deal cases. In fact, the imposition of a duty to deal
with third parties is a sensible constrain of undertakings' freedom of contract, which need not be curtailed randomly. In this sense, preliminary
finding of dominance represents a fundamental guarantee that such a
duty be only imposed on firms whose position of strength might allow
them to unduly distort competition through the refusal.
However, one might rightfully notice that competition authorities
are quite often confronted with market scenarios where a company is
dominant in a certain market but the effects of its exclusionary conduct
are going to be asserted on a second-related market where the company
has no correspondent position of economic strength. Since European antitrust law does not punish "attempt" of abuses of dominant position, it
74. Image Technical Service Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997);
In re Independent Service OrganizationsAntitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322 (2000).
75. See Spectrum Sports Inc., 506 U.S. 447. In this case, a company, BTR Inc., had
patent rights on an elastic polymer with shock-absorbing characteristics (sorbothane).
Through its fully-owned subsidiaries, BTR Inc. was the sole producer and distributor of
sorbothane which is an essential input to produce products such as medical, athletic and
equestrian products. When BTR decided to enter the market for athletic products based on
sorbothane, it cut off its commercial relationship with Shirley (formerly a distributor of
sorbothane horseshoe pad) and it became (through its subsidiary, Spectrum Sports) the
sole national provider of sorbothane-based athletic products. Such conduct was shaped as
an attempt to monopolize because Spectrum Sports' conduct was deliberately aimed at
achieving monopoly power in a distinct market where it did not have economic strength.

Id.
76. See Data General Corp., 36 F.3d 1147. It is not clear whether American antitrust
envisages some form of leveraging of market power for essential facility cases where the
doctrine seems to require, among other elements, the elimination of competition in the
downstream market. See infra Chapter II, 1.3
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could seem that such refusal to deal would risk going unpunished. This
is not the case because European antitrust law regarding abuses of dominant position acknowledges the possibility that the anticompetitive conduct will produce its effects in a distinct market from the one where the
undertaking is found to be dominant. 7 7 Specifically, the jurisprudence
regarding refusals to deal has developed around the principle that undertakings dominant in one market should not try to extend such dominance to ancillary markets. 78 Therefore, the European Commission will
first focus on the market where the company detains its competitive advantage and inquire whether it holds a dominant position in that market. Only then it will analyze the second-related market whose
competition the dominant undertaking aims at distorting. Although it is
not expressly stated in the EC Treaty, European treatment of refusal to
deal cases envisages a form of leveraging of market power from one market to a second related one. 7 9 This explains why European antitrust bodies often try to dissect two distinct markets: a first (upstream) market
where the undertaking controls the strategic input and a second (downstream) market where such input is necessary to compete.8 0 As I will
explain in a moment, this tendency is so cherished by EU competition
law, that the ECJ has been keen in framing two markets even when
81
there was just one.
77. In the case British Airways v. Commission the Court of First Instance, quoting well
settled case law by the ECJ, stressed that: "An abuse of a dominant position committed on
the dominated product market, but the effects of which are felt in a separate market on
which the undertaking concerned does not hold a dominant position may fall within Article
82 EC provided that separate market is sufficiently closely connected to the first (see, to
that effect, Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73 Istituto ChemioterapicoItaliano and Commercial
22, and Case 311/84 CBEM [1985] ECR 3261,
Solvents v Commission [1974] ECR 223,
para. 26)." British Airways v. Commission, case T 219/99, O.J. C 71, 20.03.2004, p. 22. See
also Tetra Pak InternationalSA v. Commission, case C-333/94P, [1996] ECR 1-5951, [19971
24-32.
C.M.L.R. 662,
78. Centre Belge d'Etudes du Marchg-T61marketing v. CompagnieLuxembourgeoise de
T6ldiffusion SA and Information Publicitg Benelux SA, case 311/84 [1985] ECR 3261,
[19861 2 C.M.L.R. 558.
79. The ECJ expressed the concept clearly in the case CBEM v. CLT & IPB: "[An
abuse of within the meaning of Article 82 is committed where, without any objective necessity, an undertaking holding a dominant position on a particular market reserves to itself
[...] an auxiliary activity which might be carried out by another undertaking as part of its
activities on a neighboring but separate market, with the possibility of eliminating all competition from such undertaking." Centre belge d'6tudes de marchg - T6lmarketing (CBEM)
v. S.A. Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de T6ldiffusion (CLT) and Information Publicitg
Benelux (IPB), [19851 ECR 3261, 1 27.
80. As we will see, this is not always the case when the necessary input is covered by
an intellectual property right where often the input does not amount itself to a different
upstream market.
81. See, infra at section 11.2.3 the ECJ judgement in the IMS Health case.
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The difference between the two approaches has some relevance, especially with regard to the attempt to monopolize cases. In fact, the possibility under American antitrust statutory provisions to raise a section 2
claim with no need to prove that the company already holds a substantive degree of monopoly power (but rather just a dangerous probability
that market power will be achieved as result of the conduct), seems to
increase, at least in theory, the chances that such an action will be filed.
Nonetheless, because American assessment of refusal to deal does not
take into account the strategic power that an undertaking might hold in
an upstream market where it is dominant, demonstrating that market
power will be actually achieved in the relevant market might not be easy
82
in practice.
Conversely, since claims related to article 82 require a finding of
dominance and dominance might well be found in a separate-but-related
upstream market, it may be more difficult to bring an action under art.
82, but once dominance has been found it could be easier to prove leveraging and tilt the balance for the finding of such abuses.
4.2. Abuse of dominant position and Section 1 of the Sherman Act:
where do tying practicesfall?
The analysis of two markets and an implicit finding of leveraging
permeate tying practices both in the United States and Europe. Roughly
speaking, both systems require the finding of two products which form
different markets, that the company has some sort of market power in
the market of the tying product and a form of constriction that compel
customers to buy the two products at the same time. However, both the
legal framework and the practical assessment of tying sensibly differ in
European and American antitrust.
Under EU law, a behavior that conditions the conclusion of contracts
to the acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations,
which, by the nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts, can be punished as an agreement
in restraint of trade pursuant to Article 81.1(e) or as an abusive conduct
83
under article 82(d) of the EC Treaty.
Accordingly, it may happen that two or more competitors negotiate
an agreement or simply engage in a concerted practice whereby they
82. For example, in the Microsoft case the Court divided Microsoft's conduct into three
sets of anticompetitive behaviors: violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act (tying practices); violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act (monopolization of the operating system
market); and violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act (attempt to monopolize the browser
market). Not surprisingly, only the monopolization claim was affirmed while the attempted
monopolization of the browser market (where Microsoft was not dominant) was dismissed.
U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
83. Article 82 EC Treaty, supra n. 34.
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agree to make the supply of one product conditional upon the purchase of
a second distinct product. Or, it may well happen that in a vertical relation the buyer is required to purchase a certain product as a condition of
purchasing another distinct product. In both cases, the agreement will be
assessed with regard to the market shares held by the parties and the
likely effects produced. 8 4 Nonetheless, the bulk of tying cases in the Eu85
ropean Union has developed under the abuse of dominance doctrine.
Conversely, American antitrust assessment of tying cases has developed under section 1 of the Sherman Act, as arrangement in restraint of
trade, and/or under section 3 of the Clayton Act, which expressly regulates exclusive dealing and tying arrangements.8 6 Although, at least in
84. The EU assessment of agreements in restraint of trade is strictly dependent on
market shares' threshold held by parties. First of all, EU competition law envisages a safe
harbor for horizontal agreement whereas the aggregate market shares held by parties does
not exceed 10% on any of the relevant markets affected by the agreement and for vertical
agreement whereas the market shares held by each of the parties to the agreement does
not exceed 15%. [See Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not
appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimis), O.J. C 368, 22.12.2001, p. 13-15, art. 7(a)(b)]. Secondly, EU
competition law envisages a complex system whereby agreements having as their effect a
restriction of competition may escape antitrust liability whereas all the conditions listed at
Article 81(3) are fulfilled. Please note that agreements having as their object a restriction of
competition - i.e. agreements intended to fix prices, limit output, allocate customers and or
markets - are deemed anticompetitive per se pursuant to Article 81(1). In order to facilitate
such an evaluation, EU legislators have adopted several block exemption regulations, applying to different categories of agreements, which carefully explain under what conditions
the agreement might be exempted. Once again, market shares threshold represent the first
hurdle firms must comply with. So, for example, Commission Regulation no. 2790/1999
holds that for a vertical agreement to benefit from the exemption contained therein, the
supplier (part of such agreement) shall not have a market shares threshold exceeding 30%
of the relevant market on which it sells the contract goods or services [Commission Regulation no. 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to
categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, O.J. L 336, 29.12.1999, p. 21- 25,
art. 3.1]. Similarly, Commission Regulations no. 2658/2000 and no. 2659/2000 hold that
specialization agreements and research and development agreements can benefit of an exemption on condition that the combined market share of the participating undertakings
does not exceed 20% and 25% respectively of the relevant market [Commission Regulation
no. 2658/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to
categories of specialization agreements, O.J. L 304, 5.12.2000, p. 3-6, art. 4; Commission
Regulation no. 2659/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the
Treaty to categories of research and development agreements, O.J. L 304, 5.12.2000, p. 712, art. 4.2].
85. Among the most relevant see: NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v.
Commn., ECR 3461 (1983); Hilti v. Commn., ECR 11-1439 (1991); Tetra Pak Intl. SA v.
Commn., ECR 11-755 (1994); Tetra Pak Intl. SA v. Commn., ECR 1-5951 (1996); Commission of the European Communities, Commission Decision, http://europa.eu.int/commcompetition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf (accessed Feb. 5, 2007).
86. Section 3 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S. § 14) reads: "lilt shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in commerce [. . . to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods,
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87
theory, a tie-in can also be framed under section 2 of the Sherman Act,
tying case law has almost entirely been developed under section 1 of the
Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act.

The above distinction explains why conducts that in Europe are
shaped as abuses of dominant position - as for example Microsoft's tying
of the Mediaplayer middleware to Windows operating system - have
been framed in the United States as violation of section 1 of the Sherman
88
Act.
As we are about to see, most of the American cases regarding intellectual property rights have been framed as violations of both sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act, as tying cases and attempting to monopolize.8 9 In some circumstances, courts have even framed the conduct as
tying plus both monopolizing and attempting to monopolize claims. 90
II.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EXCLUSIONARY
PRACTICES: AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN CASE
LAW COMPARED

Both American and European antitrust systems - although to different extents-seem to share a certain reluctance to employ antitrust instruments to intrude in the realm of intangible property. In the following
paragraphs I will try to provide a critical overview of the leading cases in
both United States and Europe in such a way to compare how the two
antitrust policies have developed.
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented [... ] or fix a price charged therefore, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price,
on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not
use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities of a
competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale or
contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
87. See Hovenkamp, supra n. 24, at 302-303.
88. Compare the European Microsoft case, COMP/C-3/37.792, with U.S. v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
89. The most relevant American cases dealing with the interplay between antitrust
and intellectual property rights have been framed as tying cases, under either section 1 of
the Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act, and attempt to monopolize under section 2
of the Sherman Act. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006); U.S. v.
Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 30 (D.D.C. 2000); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 112 S.Ct. 2072 (1992); IntergraphCorp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
90. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34. This premise was necessary to explain why, although
in the following of this paper I will focus my attention on cases regarding European abuses
of dominant position and American cases regarding section 2 of the Sherman Act, some
references to cases framed under section 1 of the Sherman Act might be necessary.
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1.

INTERPLAY BETWEEN

IPRs

AND ANTITRUST IN THE

AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

The relation between antitrust and intellectual property law has
never been an easy one, especially in the United States where intellectual "monopolies" are protected directly by the American Constitution. 9 1
As is well known, the core of intellectual property right is the right
to exclude third parties, for a certain amount of time, from the economic
and commercial exploitation of authors' creations or inventions. On the
contrary, the Sherman Act is meant to punish unilateral conduct aimed
at excluding competitors from markets. Often, companies employ the excluding power assigned through an intellectual property right to pursue
an exclusionary strategy (such as a refusal to license). When the firm
holds monopoly power or has a dangerous probability of success of acquiring it, such conduct is very likely to attract antitrust consideration.
This is precisely the bone of contention: allegedly, if sanctioned, a refusal
to license would have the practical effect of nullifying IP-owners exclusive faculties, in addition to a severe compression of the freedom to decide with whom to deal; this explains why the application of section 2 of
the Sherman Act to intangible monopolies has been severely criticized
92
and, de facto, restrained.
However, it must be pointed out that the treatment of refusal to deal
cases in general-and probably of all exclusionary practices-in the
United States has recently encountered a milder assessment in the sense
that fewer cases seem to suit for antitrust liability.
In the aforementioned Alcoa case, Judge Hand paradigmatically explained that antitrust provisions against monopolization practices were
not merely concerned about economic effects; rather, the statutory provisions contained in the Sherman Act were based upon the belief that
"great industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of
their economic results." 93 Today, such view of antitrust policy seems
quite outdated. The triumph of economic efficiency as the sole and ultimate goal of antitrust laws, measured against the benchmark of consumer welfare, has led to a judicial trend that is reluctant to condemn
behaviors that do not clearly and directly result in a reduction of consumer surplus: i.e. in a reduction of output and a rise in price. 9 4 Therefore, because conduct such as refusal to deals is directly aimed at
91. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have the power.., to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writing and Discoveries.").
92. As it will be shown by the analysis of the case law which follows in the next
paragraph.
93. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427-428 (2nd Cir. 1945).
94. Fox, supra n. 58, at 378.
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damaging competitors, and only through such harm does it succeed in
hampering the competitive structure of the market (hence, eventually
restrict output), recent American antitrust courts have severely questioned the anti-competitiveness of such behaviors.
A striking proof of such attitude has been given by the recent case
Verizon v. Trinko9 5 where Judge Scalia firmly stated that even when a
refusal to deal concerns access to a tangible infrastructural facility, dominant firms have no duty whatsoever to open such facility to their competitors because, in Scalia's words, compelling a dominant firm to share
the source of her own advantage "is in some tension with the underlying
purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities."9 6 Although the peculiar circumstances of the case may explain (but
not justify) the defensive attitude (towards dominant undertakings) of
the Supreme Court in Trinko,97 the expansive wording of Scalia is going
to have a massive impact over future refusal to deal cases 98 and exclusionary conducts in general, not to mention cases where the monopolization conduct is pursued through the exploitation of an IPR.
1.1.

Refusal to license IPRs as a presumptively valid business
justificationfor any immediate harm to consumers.

The complex relation between antitrust and IPRs has been extensively analyzed by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the Data
95. Verizon Commun. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
It is interesting to compare the Trinko case with the old Aspen Skiing case where the Supreme Court held that although a firm with monopoly power has no general duty to deal
with third parties, "the absence of an unqualified duty to cooperate does not mean that
every time a firm declines to participate in a particular cooperative venture, that decision
may not have evidentiary significance, or that it may not give rise to liability in certain
circumstances." Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 586. In this case, the Supreme Court held
that the Aspen Skiing refusal to keep cooperating with its only competitor, Highland, in
order to provide consumers with a weekly ski-pass ticket with access to the four slopes
violated antitrust laws.
96. U.S. v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) ("As a general matter, the Sherman Act
'does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal.'").
97. The concurring opinion signed by Justice Stevens (with Justices Souter and
Thomas concurring) takes an entirely different tone. Justice Stevens does not address the
antitrust claims; rather, he just states that AT&T's customers are not directly harmed by
Verizon's conduct, and because Verizon's conduct has been already severely punished by
both the Federal Communication Commission and the PSC, "respondent's suit runs both
the risk of duplicative recoveries and the danger of complex apportionment of damages."
Verizon Commun. Inc., 540 U.S. at 417.
98. Justice Scalia even reframes the Aspen Skiing case, the leading Supreme Court
refusal to deal case, as a limited exception to the general principle that dominant firms
have no duty to share. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 399.
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General case. 9 9 Data General was a company active in the manufacture

and repairs of personal computers. The case concerned its refusal to license third parties with a copyrighted software program it specifically
designed to diagnose its personal computers' dysfunctions. Independent
repairers claimed that the software was essential for them to repair Data
General's computer properly. Among the several issues raised in the
case, a central question regarded whether Data General's (attempt to
protect its) exclusive rights on the diagnose program could amount to a
legitimate business justification for the refusal to license and for the consequent harm suffered by consumers (in terms of elimination of competition in the provision of repair services).
As explained earlier, unilateral refusals to deal are deemed prima
facie exclusionary for purposes of a monopolization claim if there is evidence that competitive process has been harmed; 10 0 therefore, the Court
first analyzed the likely consequences copyright law exerts towards competition and consumers. At this regard, the First Circuit found that copyright law may affect consumers in the short run and favor the creation or
strengthening of monopoly power. However, the Court also pointed out
that it may not be appropriate to "judge the effect of the use of a copyright by looking only at one market or one time period."10 1 At this point
the First Circuit referred to the recent amendments of the Patent Act
where, by amending Section 271(d) of the Patent Act, Congress stated
that a refusal to license cannot constitute a misuse of the patent nor an
illegal extension of the patent right. 10 2 Although Congress had not expressly amended copyright law in a similar way, the Court held it was
quite reasonable to assume that Congress would do so because "allowing
copyright holders to collect license fees and exclude others from using
their works create a system of incentives that promotes consumer welfare in the long term by encouraging investment in the creation of desira10 3
ble artistic and functional works of expression" (emphasis added).
The Court did not hold that whatever exercise of the prerogatives
granted by copyright law - and particularly a monopoly's refusal to license - will always amount to an entirely "'pro-competitive' [conduct]
99. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147(1st Cir.1994).
100. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2; See supra section II.1.1.
101. Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1184.
102. 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(d) (1988) (providing that "no patent owner otherwise entitled to
relief for infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of the patent owner's refusal to license or use any
rights to the patent.").
The Court inferred from such proposition that no antitrust claim could be raised against a
refusal to license and that Congress had intended to create sort of an implied limited exception for patents from antitrust scrutiny. Data Gen. Corp. 36 F.3d at 1186-1187.
103. Id. at 1186-87.
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within the ordinary economic framework of the Sherman Act."10 4 Nonetheless, the Court emphasized the need to preserve the incentive system
copyright law creates in the long term to the benefit of consumers. The
Court of Appeals explained that it would be unfeasible to require antitrust defendants to challenge and prove "the merits of this legislative
assumption in every case where a refusal to license a copyrighted work
comes under attack,"1 0 5 therefore it introduced the principle that "an author's desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to
10 6
consumers."
The issue of when and how overcoming such presumption was not
articulated by the Court who shortly mentioned, in a footnote, that there
might be rare cases in which imposing antitrust liability is unlikely to
frustrate the objectives of the Copyright Act. 10 7 In particular, the First
Circuit simply held that the presumption could be rebutted by proving
that the intellectual property right had been acquired through unlawful
means. This issue has been the subject of the two following cases.
1.2.

Is the presumption truly rebuttable?

Both the Kodak108 and the Xerox' 0 9 cases involved a refusal to supply repair parts (of copying equipments, copiers and printers) to independent service organizations (ISOs) who needed such components to
provide repair and maintenance services. In both cases, the repair parts
were covered by patents and/or copyrights, there was a disruption of previous levels of supply, and the Courts stated that the refusal to supply
ISOs with patented/copyrighted parts would fall under the presumption
held in Data General. Ironically, the outcome of the cases has been quite
different.
In the Kodak case the Ninth Circuit relied largely on the specific
intent held by the dominant firm, as requested by section 2 of the Sherman Act in attempt cases. The Court found out that only at a later stage
of the trial Kodak had justified its exclusionary behavior as a strategy to
protect its intellectual assets; therefore, it concluded that the company's
asserted motivation for the refusal was merely pretextual and that pretext amounted to a valid means to rebut the presumption held by the
First Circuit in Data General. Quoting the Supreme Court certiorari on a
104. Id., at 1185.
105. Id. at 1187.
106. Id.
107. Id. Indeed, in the Data General case, the court simply reasoned that the presumption had not been rebutted because the copyright had been acquired in a lawful manner
and there was no harm to TPM.
108. Image Technical Serv. Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
109. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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different but related claim concerning the same case, the Ninth Circuit
held that "neither the aims of intellectual property law, nor the antitrust
laws justify allowing a monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct." 110
The Federal Circuit in Xerox severely criticized the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Kodak, accepting pretext as a valid means to rebut the presumption. The Federal Circuit explained that the Kodak holding
amounted to a significant departure from the First Circuit's central premise that rebutting the presumption would be an "uphill battle." Therefore, despite the fact that attempt to monopolize requires proof of a
specific intent, the Court refused to inquire into Xerox's motivation for
the refusal and (re)affirmed the principle that the presumption held in
Data General could be overcome only by showing that the IPRs had been
obtained with unlawful means or in the rare cases in which "imposing
antitrust liability is unlikely to frustrate the objectives of the Copyright
1
Act." "
1.3.

The essential facility cases

The treatment of exclusionary conduct involving IPRs under the Essential Facility Doctrine has been, if possible, even more severe than
under refusal to deal, in the sense that courts have been even more reluctant to consider ownership of an IPR tantamount to a tangible facility
and, accordingly, to deem anticompetitive the dominant company's refusal to give access to such facility. Some commentators have explained
this reluctance with the fact that if a court were to hold that an input
protected through IPRs is essential to compete in a certain market, then
they ought to grant access to such input to every competitor in a fair and
non-discriminatory way. 1 12 As a general note, however, it should be
pointed out that the application of the Essential Facility Doctrine (even
when applied to tangible facilities) has not encountered great sympathy
110. Image Technical Serv. Inc., 125 F. 3d at 1219. Kodak refused to sell repair parts to
ISOs but had also forced independent manufacturers and equipment owners not to sell
such parts to ISOs. Kodak defended itself by arguing that since it did not held monopoly on
the primary market for photocopying equipment, it was economically unfeasible for her to
leverage such power in a downstream market. Kodak alleged, indeed, that she could not
charge monopoly prices in the service market because this would have resulted in a loss of
customers in the first market. The case went up to the Supreme Court that dismantled
such thesis holding, inter alia, that information is difficult to acquire at the time of
purchase and that switching costs will lock-in old customers preventing them from changing copying equipment because of the increase in repair service price. See EastmanKodak
Co., 504 U.S. at 483-86.
111. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1329.
112. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark A. Lemley & Mark D. Janis, UnilateralRefusal to
License in the U.S., in Antitrust, Patents and Copyright, F. Lv~que and H. Shelanski eds,
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK - Northhampton MA, USA, 2005.
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1 13
in the United States.
The possibility of configuring intellectual property rights as an essential facility has been specifically addressed in the cases Intergraph
Corporation v. Intel Corp1 1 4 and Aldridge v. Microsoft Corp.11 5 Although
in both cases the courts did not rule out explicitly the possibility that
IPRs could amount to an essential facility, none of the complaint under
section 2 of the Sherman Act has been upheld.
In the first case, 1 16 the Court dismissed the essential facility claim
and the refusal to deal claim on antitrust grounds, holding that because
Intergraph and Intel were not competing in the same market an essential facility claim could not be claimed. 117 The Court explained that "unrelated harm to an individual competitor or consumer is not sufficient" to
integrate a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which is aimed at
preventing conduct that harms competition and not competitors.
The Aldridge v. Microsoft case presented a very thorny issue. Aldridge was the producer of a utility program called Cache86 whose func-

113. The most relevant critiques come from Philip Areeda, Essential Facility:an Epithet
in Need of Limiting Principles,58 Antitrust L.J. 841 (1990); but see, with specific regard to
software: David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age: Computer
Software as an EssentialFacility Under the Sherman Act, 18 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J.
771 (1995-1996), arguing that the doctrine '[...1
embodies some of the most unfortunate
tendencies of antitrust."
114. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
115. Aldridge v. Microsoft Corp., 995 F. Supp. 728 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
116. Intergraph was an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) whose main activity
involved the making and selling of computer workstations for which it used to rely on a
microprocessor based on the so called "Clipper technology." Intergraph owned the technology and the related patents. In 1993, Intergraph switched to Intel microprocessor and one
year later it became an Intel "strategic customer" and benefited from various advantages
like proprietary information and technological know-how under non-disclosure agreements. Two years later, Intergraph started suing several Intel OEM customers for violating its rights on the 'Clipper technology." Intel tried to negotiate a license for the
technology at issue, but Intergraph showed strong reluctance. The more the attempt failed,
the more the commercial relation between the two companies deteriorated to the point that
Intel denied Intergraph all the benefits it had once provided. In 1997, Intergraph brought a
suit against Intel for infringement of the Clipper patents. As the lawsuit went on, Intergraph added the antitrust violations. Intergraph Corp., 195 F.3d at 1357.
117. In MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. And Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132,
(7th Cir. 1983), and Alaska Airlines Inc. v. United Airlines Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544-45, (9th
Cir. 1991), the Court listed the following requirements as necessary for an essential facility
claim: "1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; 3) the denial of the use of the facility
to a competitor; 4) the feasibility of providing the facility;" and (5)the elimination of competition in the downstream market.
However, the Court explained that there could be no case for essential facility because such
doctrine assumes that "there must be a market in which plaintiff and defendant compete,
such that a monopolist extends its monopoly to the downstream market by refusing access
to the facility it controls." Intergraph Corp., 195 F.3d at 1357.
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tion was to accelerate the disk-writing functions of MS-DOS. In releasing
the new operating system Windows 95, Microsoft cured the fallacies of
MS-DOS-which made necessary the installation of the Cache86 on the
computer - by creating its own utility program specifically tailored to
interoperate with Windows 95. When the new Microsoft operating system was launched on the market, due to lack of compatibility between
Cache86 and Windows95, Aldridge lost several customers. The Court
was then faced with the issue of whether, and to what extent, a company
that improves its own product line ought to be compelled to share the
fruit of its labor with third parties and pre-disclose such information so
that the latter would be able to keep producing their complementary
products.
The case was easily settled because according to both parties,
Microsoft - at that time - was not dominant in the market of operating
systems, therefore access to a Microsoft specific operating system could
not be held essential to compete in the downstream related market of
applicative programs. 118 However, the Court decided to go further with
the analysis and explained that even a finding that Microsoft had monopoly power would have not been enough to change the outcome of the
case because the disk-cache program represented a market that used to
rely on an imperfection of MS-DOS 119 and punishing Microsoft for improving its own product would have inhibited, rather than promoted,
1 20
competition in that market.
The boundaries between innovation and predation are quite difficult
to draw. Clearly the Court here adopted a rather protective approach
118. Aldridge, 995 F. Supp. at 753 (noting that Aldridge did not present proof that the
entire market for disk cache programs has disappeared because the relevant market is not
the "disk cache programs operating within the domain of the Windows 95 operating
system.").
119. Id. at 754 (explaining that "even were the court to assume for purposes of argument that Windows95 could be an essential facility for application software, such as a word
processing program, it is not essential to a market whose sole purpose is to improve on
imperfections in the facility at issue.").
120. Id. at 755 (stating "A manufacturer is under no obligation to pre-disclose or disclose its knowledge about its products so that competition may arise in the related peripheral hardware, software, and repair service markets."). The Court compares the factual
circumstances of the case to a hypothetical telephone company who controls the telephone
network and the separate but related market of copper wire. The telephone monopolist,
says the Court, should not be held responsible if, following its decision to switching from
copper wire to faster fiber-optic lines, manufacturers of copper wire are driven out of the
market. Aldridge, 995 F. Supp. at 754. However, these are not the facts at issue here because Microsoft has cured the imperfection within its operating system by releasing itself
the SMARTDRV caches that uses the same technology used by Cache86. Id. at 738. Therefore, Microsoft has become a direct competitor to Aldridge. In this case, innovation rationales do not imply the elimination of a market segment but simply Microsoft wanted to
become the sole provider of caches compatible with its operating system.
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towards Microsoft and was worried about the likely consequences that
might have derived for information technologies markets had it decided
that Windows 95 amounted to an essential facility. The words of the decisions however seem too harsh. The decision seems to discriminate between programmers of common application programs and programmers
of software aimed at ameliorating operating system functionalities, as if
the latter had a lesser right to compete. Conversely, the Court chose not
to put any emphasis on the circumstance that Microsoft, exactly as it
later happened in the European Microsoft case, 12 1 used to supply Aldridge with information and beta-versions of the new versions of its operating systems and only when it decided to enter the disk-cache program
market it stopped supplying Aldridge with the test-version of the new
Windows 95.122

Several commentators have pointed out that in both cases analyzed
above, plaintiffs were concerned about maintaining the level of privileged access they had previously, and not a level of access that could be
provided to everyone. 123 However, both Intergraph and Aldridge were not
24
able to succeed neither under a refusal to deal claim.1
The Court in Aldridge explicitly questioned the possibility of extending the doctrine in cases not involving a natural monopoly or a physical infrastructure built with public funds which-it alleged - where the
1 25
only circumstances where such doctrine had been applied.
Recently, the Supreme Court has brought this sentiment of skepticism towards the doctrine one step further by claiming that it has never
officially recognized the validity of such jurisprudential creation by lower
courts, nor does it intend to acknowledge the importance of the doctrine
121. In the European Microsoft case, Sun questioned Microsoft conduct precisely because Microsoft decided to stop disclosing interoperability information necessary for group
server operating system with PC client operating system when it decided to enter that
separate market.
122. Indeed, the discontinuation of a previous business practice has always been evaluated by American Courts as proof of anticompetitive intent. It is worth recalling that the
essential facility claim is construed in American antitrust law as an attempt to monopolize
where specific intent has to be shown in order for the conduct to reach the level of "dangerous probability of success." Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585.
123. It has been argued that the continuation of such access was "essential" for plaintiffs' business but was not considerable as an essential facility doctrine under antitrust
law. Hovenkamp, Lemley, Janis, UnilateralRefusal to License in the U.S., supra n. 112, at
22.
124. In fact, both cases had been framed as refusal to deal and under the essential facility doctrine.
125. Aldridge, 995 F. Supp. at 755. As we will see later on, this criticism has been
shared also by some European scholars: John Temple Lang, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property in European Community Antitrust Law, paper delivered for the Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Hearings, Washington DC, http://www.ftc.gov/
opp/intellect/0205221angdoc.pdf (accessed Apr. 23, 2007); Korah, supra n. 12, at 801.
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in the future. 12 6

2.

INTERPLAY BETWEEN

IPRs

AND ANTITRUST IN THE

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

At the end of the eighties, the European Court of Justice was first
confronted with the complex question of whether a refusal to license an
IPR, by its legitimate owner, could amount per se to an abuse of dominant position pursuant to Art. 82 - then 86 - of the EC Treaty. 127 The
case involved a refusal to license design rights for car wings by the well
known automobile manufacturer Volvo to Mr. Veng, who allegedly used
to manufacture and import such spare parts, without Volvo's authorization. The Court avoided directly answering the question raised by the
High Court of the United Kingdom, 128 but clarified that a refusal to
grant a license by an IPR owner could not amount to an abuse of dominant position since the right to exclude third parties from the "manufacturing and selling or importing products incorporating the design
constitute the very subject matter of [Volvo's] exclusive right."129 Accordingly, the Court did not condemn Volvo's conduct. Nevertheless, the ECJ
took the chance to further explain that different circumstances from the
ones at issues might have justified the finding of an abuse. 130 Specifically, the Court listed the disruption of previous levels of supply. 13 1
126. Verizon Communs., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004).
127. Volvo v. Erik Veng, case 238/87, [19881, ECR 6211; similarly see Consorzio italiano
della componentisticadi ricambioper autoveicoli and Maxicar v. Rggie nazionale des usines
Renault, case 53/87, [1988], ECR 6039.
128. Id. The first question addressed by the British Court asked whether the mere ownership of an exclusive right over a registered design, conferring the exclusive entitlement to
make and import the product at issue, was per se sufficient to ingenerate a dominant position over such products.
129. Volvo v. Erik Veng, case 238/87, [1988], ECR 6211, para. 8.
130. Id. The ECJ, at paragraph 9, explained that a refusal to license an IPR "may be
prohibited by art. 82 if it involves, on the part of an undertaking holding a dominant position, certain abusive conduct such as the arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to independent repairers, the fixing of prices for spare parts at an unfair level or a decision no longer
to produce spare parts for a particular model even if though many cars of that model are
still in circulation."
131. Indeed, disruption of previous levels of supply has always been condemned in the
EU. Cf the leading case United Brands v. Commission, where the ECJ stated that "an
undertaking in a dominant position for the purpose of marketing a product [... ] cannot
stop supplying a long-standing customer who abides by regular commercial practice, if the
orders placed by that customer are in no way out of the ordinary. Such conduct is inconsistent with the objectives laid down in article 3(f) of the Treaty, which are set out in detail in
Article 86, especially in paragraphs (b) and (c), since the refusal to sell would limit markets
to the prejudice of consumers and would amount to discrimination which might in the end
eliminate a trading party from the relevant market." United Brands Company and United
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Magill and the exceptional circumstances test

A few months later, the Commission had the chance to improve upon
the non-exclusive list provided for in Volvo in the Magill decision, which
was later confirmed on appeal by the ECJ. The facts in Magill were peculiar at best. The case involved the refusal to license copyright on TV listings by three television broadcasters to a small company which wanted
to produce and market a comprehensive TV guide containing information regarding the three broadcasters' programming. Because each TV
company marketed its own TV guide with only its programming, a comprehensive TV guide was missing and the Court reasoned that the copyright had been strategically employed to prevent the marketing of a
product for which there was sensible consumer demand.
According to what has come to be known as the Magill test, the legitimate owner of an IPR who finds himself in a dominant position on the
market is said to abuse such position if: a) he is found to be the exclusive
holder of a raw material or input essential to run a certain business on
the market and such input is not duplicable; b) his behaviors prevents
the coming into the market of a product for which there is potential consumer demand; c) the refusal to license has no legitimate business justification; d) his behaviors had deliberately pursued the goal of reserving
to himself a downstream market by foreclosing competition to other po13 2
tential rivals.
It is interesting to note that although it is common to address Magill
as an essential facility case, neither the Commission nor the Courts mentioned the Essential Facility Doctrine. The Court underlined many times
that RTE, BBC, and ITP detained a dominant position on a scarce resource - i.e. TV listing - which was fundamental in order to compete on
the derivative market - i.e. weekly guides, 133 but it did not mention the
Essential Facility Doctrine. The reason for this may be found in the fact
that the test shaped by the Courts in Magill is kind of a hybrid test
which draws in part from general refusal to deal cases and in part from
essential facility cases. Indeed, the Commission has surely borrowed the
essentiality element and requirement that the raw material be not duplicable from the essential facility cases, 134 while it has taken the element
Brands Continentaal BV v. Commission of the European Communities, case 27/76, ECR
[19781 p. 207, §§ 182-183.
132. RTE, IPT vs. Commission, case C-241/91, C-242/91, [1995), ECR 1141, para 54.
133. RTE, IPT vs. Commission, case C-241191, C-242/91, [1995], ECR 1141, para. 47.
134. See the definition of essential facility and abuse under the Essential Facility Doctrine given in the case Sea Containersv. Stena Sealink - Interim measure, OJ 1994 LI 5/8,
at recital 66: "An undertaking which occupies a dominant position in the provision of an
essential facility and itself uses that facility (i.e. a facility or infrastructure, without access
to which competitors cannot provide services to their customers), and which refuses other
companies access to that facility without objective justification or grants access to competi-
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35
of reserving a derivative market from the refusal to deal cases.1
The significance of the Magill case lies in that for the first time the
ECJ upheld an issuance of compulsory licensing of intellectual property
right in a competition law case. The importance of such a case, however,
has been downplayed by the widespread belief that the European bodies
were deeply influenced in their decision by the trivial nature of the copy136
right at issue.
In any case, the Court of First Instance's judgment on appeal in the
Magill case has provided the most insightful analysis of the relation between intellectual property right and competition law. The CFI has
clearly explained that IPRs are to be protected as long as they stay
within the realm of the faculties granted by the law and not when their
use goes beyond the scope of protection. 13 7 When it emerges from the

tors only on terms less favourable than those which it gives its own services, infringes
Article 82 if the other conditions of Article 82 are met."
135. The EU case law regarding refusal to deal is conspicuous. The definition given in
the leading case Commercial Solvens v. Commission, [1974] ECR 223 at para. 25: "an undertaking which has a dominant position in the market in raw materials and which, with
the object of reserving such raw material for manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to
supply a customer, which is itself a manufacturer of these derivatives, and therefore risks
eliminating all competition on the part of this customer, is abusing its dominant position
within the meaning of Article 82."
136. This has been confirmed in Advocate General Jacobs' conclusion in the OscarBronner case, where the Advocate General justified the outcome of Magill and the compulsory
licensing remedy issued therein with the "special circumstances" of the case and, in particular, with the peculiar nature of the copyright which, at that time, only existed in Ireland.
Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. v. Mediaprint, case C-7/97, [1998], ECR 1-7791, para. 63.
Nonetheless, Jacobs went on explaining that "dominant undertaking's monopoly over a
product [...I may in certain cases lead to a permanent exclusion of competition in a related
market." In such cases, the only remedy to allow competition to develop is to compel the
dominant firm to grant access to the facility. Id. para. 64.
137. Already in Deutsche Grammophon, paragraph 11 of the final judgement, the Court
of Justice tried to limit the exclusive protection afforded to IPR owners only to ". . . the
purpose of safeguarding rights which constitute the specific subject-matter of such property." Deutsche Grammophon / Metro SB, case 78/70 [1971] ECR 487, para. 11. In Magill,
the CFI has moved one step ahead in that it explained that: "[t]he relationship between
national intellectual property rights and the general rules of Community law is governed
expressly by Article 36 of the Treaty, which provides for the possibility of derogating from
the rules relating to the free movement of goods on grounds of the protection of industrial
or commercial property. However, that derogation is explictly made subject to certain reservations. The protection of intellectual property rights conferred by national law is recognized, in Community law, only subject to the conditions set out in the second sentence of
Article 36. Under that provision, restrictions on free movement arising out of the protection
of intellectual property 'shall not ... constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a
disguised restriction on trade between Member States." Article 36 thus emphasizes that
the reconciliation between the requirements of the free movement of goods and the respect
which intellectual property rights are entitled must be achieved in such a way as to protect
the legitimate exercise of such rights, which alone is justified within the meaning of that
article, and to preclude any improper exercise thereof likely to create artificial partitions
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circumstances of the case that the right is exercised in such a way to
pursue an aim manifestly contrary to the objectives of Article 82, the CFI
explained that the copyright is no longer exercised in a manner which
corresponds to its essential function. Consequently, when the right is no
longer suited "to protect the moral rights in the work and ensure a reward for the creative effort," the Court established that Community principles - namely the above mentioned freedom of competition and free
movement of goods - prevail over any national intellectual property provision.1 38 Unfortunately such a clear interpretation of the relationship
between competition law and intellectual property rights has not attracted any attention by commentators nor has it been further improved
in later cases.
2.2.

Necessity of a 'new product/market' rule?

The so called exceptional circumstances set forth in Magill has been
further explored, after several years, in the IMS case. 13 9 IMS was the
leading supplier of market reports concerning sales of pharmaceutical
products in Germany. IMS allegedly held a copyright over a modular
structure (so called 1860 brick structure) it used to gather pharmaceutical data and then fill its market report, and it strategically employed the
asserted right to exclude its new competitor, NDC Health, from the market. 140 After a careful economic analysis of the German market, the
Commission concluded that IMS' brick structure amounted to a de facto
within the market or pervert the rules governing competition within the Community. The
exercise of intellectual property rights conferred by national legislation must consequently
be restricted as far as is necessary for that reconciliation (see the judgment of 14 September 1982 in Case 144/81, Keurkoop v Nancy Kean Gifts, paragraph 24)." Independent Television PublicationsLtd v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-76/89, [1991] II 575, para. 52.
138. Id., para. 56.
139. NDC Health vs. IMS Health, [20011 Case COMP D3/38.044.
140. After several years of work, together with the companies of the field, IMS developed the "1,860 brick structure," a modular system it used to collect data regarding mainly
the sales of pharmaceutical products in Germany. The data gathered through this partitioning scheme constitute the raw materials IMS used to release market reports that it sold
back to pharmaceutical companies. When NDC Health, IMS' largest competitor, entered
the German market to provide a similar service, IMS sued NDC for copyright infringement
before the German Court. The Landesgericht Frankfurt am Main (German District Court)
granted an interim measure inhibiting PI (Pharma Intranet Information AG) - the company NDC had bought - from using the 1,860, 2,847 or any structure that derived from the
1,860 structure on the basis that they constituted a personal intellectual creation belonging
to IMS. However, the Frankfurt Court filed, at the same time, a request for a preliminary
ruling asking the ECJ to clarify its position with regard to the relation between an abuse of
dominant position according to Art.82 EC Treaty and the refusal to license access to a
database covered by copyright protection. At the same time, NDC Health lodged a complaint to the European Commission alleging IMS' breach of Art. 82 through an unjustified
refusal to grant access over an intangible asset deemed essential to compete on the market.
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standard essential for operating in that relevant market. The conclusion
was based on the fact that consumers (i.e. pharmaceutical firms) were
practically locked-in to IMS' product and would not switch to any other
supplier. This is because the very same pharmaceutical firms had been
significantly involved in the development of the structure which now represented the product perfectly tailored to satisfy their needs. 4 1 Moreover, the Commission observed that even in absence of lock-in effects, the
structure was not duplicable because of strong legal and administrative
constraints.142
The IMS case, however, differed sensibly from Magill because IMS'
refusal to license was not directed at preventing a new product from entering the market; instead, NDC Health simply wanted to compete in the
provision of market reports, a product already offered by IMS. Accordingly, the identification of two separate markets was very controversial.
In order to overcome such hurdle, the Commission reasoned that the Magill holding did not call for a cumulative application of the so called "exceptional circumstances" and it convincingly explained that in IMS other
14 3
significant circumstances made the overall scenario exceptional:
namely, the Commission referred to the explosive mixture of legal and
44
economic barriers which impeded second-comers to enter the market.'
141. The usefulness of sales data lies in pharmaceutical companies' utilizing it to compare their sales percentage with competitors and to evaluate the performance of sales representatives along segments of the territory. Since all firms use the 1860 brick structure,
the value of the structure itself has notably increased - i.e. this is a typical case of network
effect where the value of a certain good increases proportionally to the number of users. If
one undertaking would be willing to change their provider of regional sales data, it would
then incur the costs of reverting the data into the format of the 1860 brick structure in
order to make appropriate comparison with its old data and with old and present data of its
competitors. Both comparability and the high switching costs would deter the firm from
changing structure (see paras 93-106). Likewise, the evaluation of those sales representatives', whose sale territories are allocated with regard to the segmentation of the 1860 brick
structure - each representative performs its activity within a certain number of bricks and often are indicated in the working contracts: a change in sales territory pursuant to a
different structure would cause a loss in relationship among sales representatives and doctors as well as modification of the working contracts (see paras 107-123).
142. Indeed, according to the Commission analysis adopting a partitioning of territories
according to postal codes represented the best feasible way to segment the German territory. Recall also that the small number of segments required by the brick structure not
only was needed to keep the structure stable (technical constraint), but was a compulsory
requirement according to the German data protection law (which requires at least three
pharmacies to be grouped in a brick). see Id., para 127 and ff.
143. With no need of a new product/market rule to find the conduct abusive. See NDC
Health vs. IMS Health, [2001] Case COMP D3/38.044, para. 180.
144. In giving such interpretation, the Commission brought the reasoning of the Ladbroke case a step further. In the Ladbroke the Court of First Instance explained that: "the
refusal to supply the applicant could not fall within the prohibition laid down by Article 86
unless it concerned a product or service which was either essential for the exercise of the
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The requirement that the exclusionary conduct be directed at reserving to the dominant company a derivative market relating to a new product for which there is substantial consumers' demand-hence at
leveraging market power from an upstream market to a downstream one
- has been central in the European debate concerning the interplay between antitrust and intellectual property laws. Some authors have
strongly argued in favor of leveraging to be proved. 14 5 In particular,
some of them have motivated their opinion explaining that the element
of the prevention of a new product for which there is sensible consumer
demands serves the purpose of proving consumer harm as result of the
conduct. 1 46 Conversely, other commentators have shown some skepticism 1 4 7 and have supported the Commission interpretation of the alternativeness of the exceptional circumstances, claiming that even in
Magill the finding of two separate markets amounted to an unnecessary
1 48
and improbable construction of the circumstances of the case.
2.3.

Leveraging of market power in IMS Health and in the Microsoft
case
Unfortunately both the CF11 4 9 and later the ECJ-in response to

activity in question, in that there was no real or potential substitute, or was a new product
whose introduction might be prevented, despite specific, constant and regular potential
demand on the part of consumers." (italics added, Tiercg Ladbroke SA v. Commission, Case
T-504/93, [1995], ECR 11-2537, para. 131). In the IMS case, the Commission brought Ladbroke reasoning it a step further by implicitly extending the alternative of the requirements to the element of the derivative market.
145. Korah, supra n. 12, at 805; Temple Lang, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual
Property in European Community Antitrust Law, http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020522
langdoc.pdf (accessed Feb. 5, 2007).
146. Id.
147. Steven Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights in the
New Economy, The Antitrust Bulletin 295 (2002).
148. More extensively on this point, Frank Fine, NDC/IMS: A Logical Application of
Essential FacilitiesDoctrine, 23 E.C.L.R. 9, 457-468, (2002).
149. After less than a month, IMS appealed to the Court of First Instance which reversed the decision inauditaalteraparte. The CFI alleged that this case differed substantially from Magill and claimed that the Commission misconstrued the scope of Magill in
assessing that the applicant's behavior amounted to a primafacie case of an abuse of dominant position. IMS Health Inc. v. European Commission, proceeding T-184/01 R 1, August
2001, para. 24. On a procedural ground, the Court further explained that the Commission
order extended beyond the traditional powers afforded to it by the Camera Care jurisprudence in that it did not merely preserve the situation quo ante but it legitimized a conduct
which was previously illegitimate. Indeed, according to IMS and CFI allegations, the interim measure had the effect of allowing IMS competitors to legitimately enter and stay on
the market, while they could have done this earlier only through an infringement of copyright. IMS Health Inc. vs. European Commission, proceeding T-184101 R 1, August 2001,
para. 25; see also Korah, supra n. 12, at 828.
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the preliminary reference of the Landgericht of Frankfurt am Main' 5 0cut back the Commission interpretation of the exceptional circumstances
in Magill and restated the importance that the exceptional circumstances be all cumulatively met and that only those behaviors that impede, by means of the refusal to license, the development of 'derivative'
products/markets, be punished. 1 51
Nonetheless, the decision of the European Supreme Court is important in several respects. In particular, it is worth mentioning that the
ECJ recognized the role of network and lock-in effects as economic factors
rendering the data in question essential, together with the intellectual
property right. 152 Secondly, the ECJ has made a tentative step towards
the clarification of the double-market requirement issue explaining that
two markets can be found even when "two different stages of production
may be identified and [... I they are interconnected, inasmuch as the
upstream product is indispensable for the supply of the downstream
product."1 5 3 The actual implications of this last sentence are not easy to
A few months later, the CFI clarified its position on the merits and explained that it did not
agree with the Commission's analysis of the precedent case law, in particular with the
alternative interpretation of the exceptional circumstances of Magill. IMS Health Inc. v.
European Commission, proceeding T-184/01 R 2, October 2001, para. 104.
150. For the sake of precision, it is worth mentioning that following the Frankfurt Oberlandesgericht's ruling on the appeal pleaded by Pharma Intranet [Pharma Intranet Information AG v. IMS Health GmbH & Co., FFM Superior Regional Court, 11 U 67/2000, 2/3 0
283/00 Fft. am Main Reg. Ct, in Computer und Recht, 2003, 50] the Commission announced
its decision to withdraw the interim measures issued against IMS Health. See Commission
intervention no longer necessary to enable NDC Health to compete with IMS Health, August
13th 2003, O.J. L 268, 18.10.2003, p. 69-72. For a more comprehensive description of the
German decision see E. Arezzo, Competition Policy and IPRs: An Open Debate on an EverGreen Issue, 3 Dir. Aut. 2004, also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=896103 (accessed
Feb. 5, 2007).
151. The ECJ explained that in order for an abuse to exist it is necessary, inter alia,
that "the undertaking which requested the license does not intend to limit itself essentially
to duplicatingthe goods or services already offered on the secondary market by the owner of
the copyright, but intends to produce new goods or services not offered by the copyright
owner and for which there is a potential consumer demand" (emphasis added). See IMS
Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-418/01 [2004] ECR I5039, para. 49.
152. Although the ECJ did not directly mention the terms network effect and switching
costs, the Court held that: "[flor the purposes of examining whether the refusal by an undertaking in a dominant position to grant a licence for a brick structure protected by an
intellectual property right which it owns is abusive, the degree of participation by users in
the development of that structure and the outlay, particularly in terms of cost, on the part
of potential users in order to purchase studies on regional sales of pharmaceutical products
presented on the basis of an alternative structure are factors which must be taken into
consideration in order to determine whether the protected structure is indispensable to the
marketing of studies of that kind". See IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health
GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-418/01 [2004] ECR 1-5039, para. 53, point 1.
153. Id. para. 45.
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grasp. At a first glance, one might think that the ECJ intended somehow
to amend the mistakes made in Magill when it confirmed that two distinct markets were present, indicating an upstream market for TV listings and a downstream market for TV guides.' 5 4 In stating that the
upstream market can even be represented by a raw input employed in an
upper segment of the production scale, the Court seems willing to ease
compliance with the double markets requirement. However, if one reads
this sentence together with the rest of the judgment 15 5 it seems that it
remains quite difficult to meet the terms of the overall test.
The question of the "new product/market" requirement came again
with the European Microsoft case where Commissioner Monti ordered
Microsoft to disclose the specifications of the interfaces (but not the
source code) 156 of the Windows workgroup server operating system to
competitors (especially Sun Microsystems). This was ordered to enable
competitors to achieve full interoperability of their server operating systems with Microsoft's, and in particular, to ensure them the same degree
of compatibility that exists between the Microsoft's servers and the Win157
dows operating systems for personal computers.
Once again the Commission framed the case as a leveraging case
where Microsoft had attempted to shift its monopoly power from the upstream market (namely: client operating systems) to the downstream
market of workgroup server operating systems. In fact, the Commission
clearly explained that while it was true that Sun's request involved both
client- to-server and server-to-server interoperability, the latter interconnections and interactions were functionally related to the client
154. Indeed, in Magill there was not an actual separate market for TV listings as raw
materials. As it has been pointed out, the three broadcasting companies used to grant licenses for free on their daily listings. Frank Fine, NDC/IMS: a Logical Application of Essential FacilitiesDoctrine, supra n. 148, at 459.
155. In particular, one should read it together with the last sentence of para. 49 [supra
footnote 151] where the ECJ restates that the company asking for a license must be willing
to " . . . produce new goods or services not offered by the copyright owner and for which
there is a potential consumer demand."
156. Commission Decision, dated 24.03.2004, relating to a proceeding under article 82
of the EC Treaty, case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, [20041 paras. 568-572.
157. Id. paras 177-178. According to the Commission, the functioning of a (Windows)
work group network "relies on an architectureof client-to-server and server-to-server interconnections and interactions, which ensures a transparent access to the core work group
server services [.. .]", where "The common ability to be part of that architecture is an
element of compatibility between Windows client PCs and Windows work group servers".
See the Commission Decision, dated 24.03.2004, relating to a proceeding under article 82 of
the EC Treaty, case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, para 182. Pursuant to the Commission's
analysis, Microsoft inserted specific code portions of the PC client operating system into
work group server operating systems (Windows 2000) in such a way as to make the interoperability between client and server faster and more effective.
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PC.158 However, it is interesting pointing out that, unlike in the IMS
case, the Commission eventually found that a refusal to disclose information essential to allow competition on the same market amounted to an
abuse of dominant position, even if the conduct was not impeding the
release of a new product.
III.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND MARKET POWER

The widespread reluctance to dismantle IP "monopolies" through antitrust intervention is often explained by a common misconception that
antitrust intrusion would interfere with the precise legal and economic
rationales that ground intellectual property laws. Indeed, an order compelling a certain company, for example, to license a certain proprietary
technology would directly interfere with the exclusive faculties which are
the core of IPRs. As the argument goes, were companies to know that IP
protection is easy to circumvent and curtail, they would not have adequate incentives to invest in the first place, to the damage of society at
large.
Such a view is highly misleading because it runs contrary to the basic assumptions of intellectual property laws which were designed to create exceptional situations-islands of monopolies in a sea of
competition-that prized the few creative minds to drive the many to the
next level of innovation-based competition.
1.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AS 'MICRO-MONOPOLIES'

As well known, intellectual property rights are commonly defined as
exclusive rights in the sense that they vest in only some people, usually
creators or inventors, with the exclusive right to dispose of their intellectual works. Such a definition, however, is often misunderstood and IPRs
are intended as a constitutional guarantee towards the recoupment of
the expenses incurred in the inventive/creative activity. Quite on the
contrary, intellectual property rights come with intrinsic limitations.
First of all, their duration is limited. Secondly, the faculties granted to
inventors/creators bear limitations and they were never meant to confer
absolute control over their intangible creations. Accordingly, several
tradeoffs exist within intellectual property paradigms, which make the
protection conditional on the fact that the intangible knowledge comes
immediately to the enrichment of society at large. To mention just a
couple of examples, the patentee's exclusive right has never granted him
158. See id. para. 567. The Commission explained that: "the link back to the client PC
operating system market implies that the competitive value of the information refused derives from Microsoft's market strength in the client PC operating system market. Insofar
as Microsoft's refusal is considered abusive, the abuse derives from Microsoft's dominance
on the client PC operating system market."
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the right to impede the creation of competing products aimed at resolving the same technical problem.159 The moment patent protection is issued and the technical teaching contained therein spreads to the world,
the patentee cannot impede others to try to supply the same utility pro160
vided by his invention through a different and independent process.
Similarly, copyright law lies on the idea-expression dichotomy principle,
whereby protection is only confined to the specific forms of expression
and not the ideas embedded therein. 16 1 As for patent law, even under
copyright law the specific embedment of the author's creativity will enter
the public domain only after legal protection expires. Nonetheless, the
ideas expressed therein immediately come to enrich society at large.
Because commentators, generally economists, use to refer to intellectual property rights as monopolies, there is a widespread misleading
belief that patents and copyrights entitle the author to obtain a monopoly in the economic sense.1 6 2 This is very far from reality, for both IP
paradigms. Patents and copyrights only afford authors a set of exclusive
rights which are strictly limited to the fruit of their intellectual labor. As
a general principle, the exclusive power to economically dispose of a certain product vests the author with a modicum of market power which
will be inversely proportioned to the number of existing substitutes for
such product. The smaller the number of competing products, the greater
the power the owner will derive from the exclusive right.
In the case of copyright law, usually many substitute products will
exist (think about the market for books, music, movies, software), therefore it is very unlikely that the IPR alone will confer substantial market
power. The case of patents could be a little different. In the case of a
blockbuster drug, for example, where no other medicines exist to cure a
certain disease, the patent will vest the IP owner with a good degree of
market power, maybe even with monopoly power (intended, as
Hovenkamp explained, as substantial market power). This even more
159. For a comprehensive overview of American patent law see R. J.R. Peritz, Rethinking U.S. Antitrust and Intellectual Property Rights, NYLS Legal Studies Research Paper
no. 04/05-22 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=719745).
160. Ghidini, supra n. 2, at 25-26.
161. This principle has been affirmed in the famous Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879),
and it is also codified at international level by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), signed by the Members of GATT,April 15, 1994 at
Marrakesh, Morocco, art. 9.2
162. Posner explains that the use of the word 'monopoly' with regard to IPRs "though
common is unfortunate, because it confuses an exclusive right with an economic monopoly.
[...
I A patent or a copyright does carve out an area of exclusive rights, but whether the
right holder can use his right to obtain a monopoly return depends on whether there are
good substitutes for his product [...]". See Richard A. Posner, Transaction Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing of Intellectual Property, Les Nouvelles, (Mar. 1, 2005).
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apparent where patents are improperly granted too far upstream. 163
However, it is nowhere guaranteed that such power will last along the
entire twenty years of protection granted by the patent. A better drug, or
gene-therapy, might be found a little later and the more the new product
is effective, the more it will steel consumers away from the first drug. In
other industrial sectors, like engineering or computing, inventions often
take the form of improvement products or ameliorated processes and
methods of productions; therefore, they always come about in a market
that is already there and has some players. The same goes for a great
part of the pharmaceutical sector where companies invest in new molecules and drugs to find better treatments for diseases which have already some sort of cure.
In conclusion, while the word "monopoly" does not seem appropriate
for IPRs, we could affirm that intellectual property laws give a "micromonopoly" over a specific technical solution for a certain problem, or over
a certain form of expression. In systematic terms, an IPRs' function is to
protect inventors and authors from free riding16 4 against competition by
imitation but not competition by substitution 16 5 .
As hinted, the degree of market power associated with these micromonopolies will often be quite low in normal market circumstances. Indeed, a likely attempt to increase the price of a product (be it patented or
copyrighted) will often be unprofitable because consumers will turn to
competing products. The price increase will be profitable only when no
substitutes are present in the relevant market or where other specific
circumstances exist that favour distortion of competitive market
structures.
2.

IPRs

AND INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE

It is interesting to note that for the great majority, exclusionary conduct concerning an intellectual property right involves an improper attempt to use the protection beyond what has been granted by the
statutory norms. This may happen because ip-owners try to stretch the
protection in a way to cover mere ideas, whereas both copyright and pat163. At this regard see Dreyfuss, supra n. 12.
164. Gustavo Ghidini and Emanuela Arezzo, On the Intersection of IPRs and Competition Law with regardto Information Technology Markets (forthcoming in European Competition Law Annual 2005: The Relation Between Competition Law and Intellectual Property
Law (Hart Publishing 2006)).
165. Joseph Drexl, Beatriz Conde-Gallego, Stefan Enchelmaier, Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt & Florian Endter, Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property,
Competition and Tax Law, (Munich) on the Directorate General Competition Discussion
Paper of December 2005 on the Application of Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Exclusionary
Abuses, 37 IIC International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 5, 558
2006.
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ent law limit the exclusive right to the form of expression and to the
technical embedment of the inventive concept; hence, they try to strategically employ their exclusive right in an attempt of monopolizing or preserving dominance in a certain market (a macro-monopoly covering the
whole sector rather than the "micro-monopoly" covering only the fruit of
their intellectual labor). 166 This often occurs when the intellectual property right covers a certain raw material or input indispensable to compete in a certain market. 16 7 Alternatively, it may also happen that ipowners employ the intellectual (micro)monopoly in a way to obtain market power in a separate but connected market segment.1 68 These strategic behaviours are quite common. Every undertaking tries to maximize
its profits and employs its resources and strategic advantages in the best
possible way. Nor does antitrust law condemn such behaviours tout
court. Indeed, an exclusionary conduct operating through IP exclusive
faculties is likely to attract antitrust scrutiny only insofar as the company holds monopoly power or there is a dangerous probability that it
will acquire it as result of the conduct; or, in European antitrust law, if
the company is first found to be dominant on a certain market.
It is important to stress that, as outlined above, only in rare circumstances an intellectual property right alone is capable of granting monopoly power. On the contrary, it may often occur that a company succeeds
in strengthening its position in a certain market thanks to several legal
and economic factors it is able to turn to its own advantage. In this latter
scenario, IPRs can well be one of these factors that contribute, together
with others, to the attainment of a substantial degree of market power,
as well as a means to preserve and further strengthen such market
power, once achieved.

166. See supra para II.l.l.This happened, for example, in the American refusal to deal
cases analyzed above where the intellectual property right was improperly used to impede
competition in the market of Data General's computer repairs.
167. See supra paras 11.2.1. and 11.2.3. This happened in the European Magill case
where broadcasting companies implemented their presumed copyright on tv listing to impede competition in the tv guide market. Similarly, in IMS Health, IMS strategically implemented its copyright on the selection criterion to collect pharmaceutical data to prevent
NDC Health from entering the market reports' market, where IMS was the only player. See
supra paras 11.2.1. and 11.2.3.
168. See supra para. 11.2.3. This occurred in both American and European Microsoft
litigations whereby the Redmont company tried to expand its power to adjacent market
segments by tying an application program to the sale of its operating system and, in the
European case, by refusing to share interoperability information necessary for rivals to
compete in the market of operating system for work group servers (where Microsoft also
competed).
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2.1. Increasing returns to scale
Among the several factors an undertaking can successfully employ
to achieve dominance, network effects, more technically defined as 'econo169
mies of scale in consumption' have attracted a good deal of attention.
The term network effect describes the phenomenon whereby the utility a
consumer obtains from a given good grows proportionally to the number
of other consumers using the same product. 170 This phenomenon acts as
a powerful 'catalyst' of consumer demand, in the sense that the more
consumers buy the product, the more other consumers will desire the
same product. The classical example is given by mobile phone networks.
Because users know that they will get special tariffs to call users of the
same network, they will choose the network mostly used by their friends
and acquaintances. The greater the number of friends using a certain
network, the more profitable it will be for them to join that specific network. This self-perpetuating mechanism, that continues to attract more
and more consumers to the network, is generally called a direct network
effect. Conversely, it also happens that the increase in the number of
buyers of a certain product causes a consequential boost in the launch of
compatible products, as other companies will find it profitable to invest
in a product capable of use in connection with the widespread networked
good (indirect network effects). This, eventually, will make the basic
171
product even more appealing to consumers.
169. Many studies have been dedicated to the economic analysis of network effects in
new economy markets. In particular see Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition,and Compatibility,75 Am. Econ. Rev. 424 (1985); Carl Shapiro & Hal
R. Varian, Information Rules, A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy, (Harward Business School Press 1999); Carl Shapiro & Michael L. Katz, Antitrust in Software Markets, in
Competition,Innovation and the Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in the DigitalMarketplace,
(Eisenach & Lenard eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust
and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economies, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 535 (2001); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Analysis in High-Tech Industries:A
19th Century Discipline Addresses 21st Century Problems, www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/
000615speech.htm (last accessed Feb. 6, 2007); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could
Java Change Everything? The Competitive Propriety of a ProprietaryStandard, 43 Antitrust Bull. 715 (1998); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implication of Network
Economic Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 479 (1998); Joseph Farrel & Michael L. Katz, The Effects
of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law on Compatibility and Innovation, 43 Antitrust
Bull. 609 (1998).
170. This definition has been provided by Katz and Shapiro (Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 424
(1985)). Some other scholars give an even broader definition, explaining network effects as
the situation where the value consumers attach to a certain good increases whenever another person acquires a compatible good (Joseph Farrel & Garth Saloner, Standardization,
Compatibility and Innovation, 16 Rand J. Econ. 70 (1985).). Therefore, according to both
definitions, the more consumers buy a certain product or subscribe to a certain service, the
more the latter becomes valuable and appealing to other potential buyers.
171. Ghidini & Arezzo, supra n. 164.
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The phenomenon of network effects can prove to be particularly
troublesome in markets with a tendency towards 'tipping' - generally
high tech sectors. The concept of a tipping market can be explained as a
form of de facto standardization. Most of the times, standards are imposed from the above, by governmental units or by so called standard
setting organizations, directly composed by firms expert in the technology at issue. Other times, however, the standard is not set and it will
emerge as result of consumer preferences.
The phenomenon of tipping regards a market situation where two or
more competing technologies or products cannot live together because
consumers do not want to bear the cost of getting them all for the same
use. Indeed, tipping normally happens either for technologies used to
communicate in a broad sense or where compatibility is essential. To go
back to the telephone example, let's assume that each telephone network
company would provide a service that only allows users to talk with
members of the same network. 172 If it were so, consumers should subscribe to two, three or maybe four telephone networks in order to be able
to get hold of all the people they know. Because a subscription to many
networks is expensive, consumers would than accurately choose only one
or two networks. At the end of the day, consumers would all move to one
single network which would naturally emerge as the standard.
Tipping and network effects are strictly related. When network effects do exist in a certain market, they will have a pivotal role in determining the emergence of a product as a de facto standard. Indeed,
chances are that the sooner a first cluster of demand is created around a
certain product, the more likely it will be that network effects will tilt the
overall demand towards such a product.
However, as many commentators have argued, the emergence of a
certain product as a market standard over a competing one, as a result of
consumers' choice, does not guarantee that the selection mechanism will
sort out the best technology, nor even the most efficient one. 17 3 On the
contrary, it all goes back to the moment the first cluster of demand is
created and the reason why such cluster forms around one product instead of another. At this regard, it has been pointed out that such a
choice might well be the result of a sapient evaluation and comparison
made by consumers, but, similarly, it might be attributed to random factors, like a successful advertising campaign or the launch of the product
at a negligible price. 174 The launch of a certain product at a negligible
172. In this example, I assume that they cannot talk with people joining other networks
at all, not even at a very high price.
173. Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Dynamic Efficiency and US Antitrust Policy, in Post-Chicago
Developments in Antitrust Law 108 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2002).
174. W. Brian Arthur, IncreasingReturns and Path Dependence in the Economy (University of Michigan Press 1994).
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price can prove particularly profitable whenever the firm knows that
consumers are going to be trapped by it.
2.2.

Lock-in effects and switching costs

Consumers are usually said to be locked-in a certain technology or
product(s) whenever they feel that changing towards an alternative good
would not be profitable for them in terms of either price or time or both.
Where the product at issue is particularly expensive, consumers will not
be willing to incur a second expense for a similar item and will rather
prefer to update it. 17 5 Similarly, once users get acquainted with a product embedding a complex technology they will be reluctant to turn to a
substitute product-although the latter can well be more advanced and
superior in technology than the one they have - because they are reluctant to incur learning costs all over again. While lock-in effects and
switching costs are often found together with network effects, it is important to point out that they can also exist separately from the latter.
Moreover, it is also worth mentioning that while both set of effects often
take place in high tech markets, this does not preclude their presence in
1 76
a more traditional competitive scenario.
3.

THE AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN APPROACHES COMPARED

From what explained above, it emerges that while IPRs alone are
rarely sufficient to vest companies with a degree of market power likely
to negatively affect market dynamics, when such rights are coupled with
different kinds of economics effects the scenario changes drastically. The
mixture of network effects, lock-ins and IPRs 177 can sensibly alter competition leading to inefficient results such as the persistence of the second best technology, to the detriment of technological process; hence,
175. This even in the case of complementary products whereby consumers need to
purchase, on a regular basis, a second product to be used together with the first (ex. printer
and cartridges) and he later realizes that another company offers a better deal for the two
products together but he does not want to incur the first expense (for the equipment) again.
176. Think about lock-in effects present in the Kodak case and the network effects present in the IMS Health case. In both examples, the markets at issue were not information
technology markets.
177. I have purposefully chosen this order to signal the different moments of the business strategy where each factor usually is taken into consideration. In fact, usually the
company will first act strategically to exploit network effects to its own advantage and
capture the widest possible installed base. Secondly, lock-in effects take place as consumers
realize they are unwilling to change to a competing product. Third, intellectual property
rights enter the stage as they are usually implemented to keep competitors off the market
by suing them for counterfeiting.
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178
with a damage for society at large.

3.1.

The American approach

The American case law seems to have embarked on a rather stark
trend towards refusal to deal in general and refusal to license in particular. The presumption that preserving the faculties granted by IPRs always amounts to an objective business justification for an exclusionary
conduct, as lastly shaped by the Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit
in Xerox, seems to leave little room for rebuttal; 1 79 not to mention for a
case by case consideration of other significant factors like network
effects.
In the Data General case, the First Circuit recognized a tension between the antitrust benchmark of static allocative efficiency and the dynamic rationale underlying IPRs and it held that "[. . .1 at least, in a
particular market and for a particular period of time, the Copyright Act
tolerates behavior that may harm both consumers and competitors".18 0
But the Court provided a very reassuring explanation for the reader by
asserting that the two policies are complementary and both designed "ultimately to improve the welfare of consumers in our free market

system". 181
The First Circuit holding in Data General and the Federal Circuit
holding in Xerox are emblematic of the change in economic theory towards a Schumpeterian view of intellectual property rights as necessary
strategic tools that help big concerns to protect themselves against the
"perennial gales of creative destruction".' 8 2 Schumpeter explained that
"long-range investing under rapidly changing conditions [. . .1 is like
shooting at a target that is not only indistinct but moving - and moving
jerkily at that". Assuming that only big concerns were capable of fostering economic and technological process, he cherished the view that undertakings ought to be allowed to recur to whatever defensive tools and
strategies to protect their own businesses. In the basket of defensive
tools, Schumpeter listed patents and trade secrets as well as other defen178. Indeed think that often (not always) the best technology that did not succeed in the
standard race will leave the market therefore that entire technology path will be
abandoned.
179. See supra para II. 1.1.This especially if the presumption is read in conjunction with
Section 271(d) of the Patent Act as last amended by Congress. 35 U.S. 271(d)(4).
180. Data General Corp., 36 F.3d at 1184-1185. The Court added: "[T]he primary purpose of the antitrust laws-to preserve competition-can be frustrated, albeit temporarily,
by a holder's exercise of the patent's inherent exclusionary power during its term.", cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1016, 102 S.Ct. 1708, 72 L.Ed.2d 132 (1982). 36 F.3d 1185.
181. Id. at 1186.
182. Joseph R. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 84 (Harper & Row
Publishers Inc. 1942).
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sive behaviors such as aggressive pricing policies or additional investments to produce excess capacity for aggressive or defensive purposes
(behaviors which were and currently are condemned as anticompetitive
conduct).183
It is not clear, however, whether such a shift towards Schumpeterian views comes at the right moment in time, given the underlying economic factors and phenomena that characterize new economy markets.
As I have pointed out, the risk is sensible that a convulsive combination
of intellectual property rights and economic effects will vest the dominant undertaking with the power not just to monopolize the market but
to shift such power from one market to another, to create strong barriers
to entry and, in so doing, granting the perpetuation of such dominance
for quite a long time. In other words, not only the dominant undertaking
will be able to surf through the perennial gales of creative destruction,
but it would do that right on the top of the wave. At the extreme, it will
be the very same dominant company who will set the pace of new innovation waves where locked-in customers will be forced to abandon the old
technology to purchase the new (always provided by the dominant
company).
In line with Schumpeter's assumptions, the First Circuit concluded
static efficiency must be sacrificed in order to grant ip-owners the chance
to maximize their profits and get the ad hoc incentives that will lead
them to innovate. However, it is important to point out that lacking any
consideration for these other relevant factors, there is a considerable risk
that consumers will suffer a twofold harm: in fact, not only they will face
an immediate restriction of competition in the short run, but chances are
that such restriction will be for nothing, because it is not sure at all that
such restriction will foster creativity nor that it will ensure that the best
and most advanced product be affirmed in the market.
3.2.

The European approach

The American case law, throughout the presumption set in the Data
General case and confirmed in Xerox, seems to grant IP-owners a sensible advantage in that their unilateral conduct will always be presumed
legitimate, unless the plaintiff is successful in proving the contrary. Conversely, the European system seems to have endorsed a more balanced
approach. The focus of European assessment has not been placed upon
183. Id. at 88. This passage is highly expressive of Schumpeter's views: "In analyzing
such business strategy ex visu of a given point of time, the investigating economist or government agent sees price policies that seem to him predatory and restrictions of output
that seem to him synonymous with opportunities to produce. He does not see that restrictions of this type are, in the conditions of the perennial gale, incidents, often unavoidable
incidents, of a long-run process of expansion which they protect rather than impede."
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whether protection of an IP may or may not amount prima facie to a
legitimate business justification; rather, European bodies have decided
to concentrate on the overall market scenario where intellectual property, together with other market circumstances, exert their effects. In
such a framework, consideration is given to the fact that the dominant
undertaking might have acted to protect and safeguard its own business.
However, such considerations are not simply based on IPRs but on the
overall situation the dominant firm has been facing. Moreover, consideration of a legitimate business justification only takes place later on in the
test (the so called Magill test), whereas the first requirement concerns a
dominant undertaking's possession of a raw material or input which is
essential to run a certain business on the market and such input is not
184
duplicable.
As further proof of the European attention to the overall market situation where IP protection is asserted, it is important to notice that even
the ECJ, responding to the preliminary ruling in the IMS case, stressed
the way network and lock-in effects had played in the overall situation,
together with IPRs.18 5 Overall, EU antitrust enforcement is concerned
about preserving a competitive structure of the market and when such
scenario are at risk, they do not exclude the possibility to constrain the
use of an IPR insofar as this would be the only feasible way to restore
competition;1 86 this, although they acknowledge that the possession of
patent or copyright is not in itself the cause of the abuse.
Having said the above, it is important to stress that the test adopted
by the European bodies is not easy to comply with. European bodies are
well aware of the potential dangers stemming from a too lenient imposition of a duty to share upon dominant firms.18 7 This is exactly why the
Commission has elaborated an ad hoc test (the Magill test) with its own
prongs which makes it different from both the mere essential facility test
184. See supra, para. 11.2.1. This is the first prong of the above mentioned Magill test.
185. IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-418/01,
[2004] ECR 1-5039, para. 53, point 1.
186. With regard to the circumstances of the IMS case, Drexl has pointed out that "although it may not be denied that in IMS Health the copyright is not the cause of the dominant position, the copyright remains essential so that IMS Health can effectively exploit its
dominant position". He concludes, therefore, that even if the exclusive right does not represent in itself the cause of the overall monopolistic situation, "the competition problem
may be cured by restricting the exercise of the exclusive right". See J. Drexl, IMS Health
and Trinko,-Antitrust Placebo for Consumers Instead of Sound Economics in Refusal-toDeal Cases, 7 IIC International Rev. of Intellectual Property & Competition L. 788 (2004).
187. At this regard, it will be important to recall Advocate General Jacobs' words in the
Oscar Bronner case: "[.. .] The incentives for a dominant undertaking to invest in efficient
facilities would be reduced if its competitors were, upon request, able to share the benefits
[... ]". Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. vs. Mediaprint, case C-7/97, [1998], ECR 1-7791, para.
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and the mere refusal to deal assessment.18 8
It may even be argued that the European test is too restrictive insofar as it is interpreted to require all the exceptional circumstances (listed
in the Magill test) to be cumulatively met.' 8 9 In particular, the requirement to show that the dominant firm intends to reserve to itself a separate derivative market for a new product is surely too cumbersome to
comply with and, at the same time, unnecessary for several reasons. It is
difficult to comply with such a prong because, as the cases have shown, it
may but it also may not happen that the dominant company attempts to
leverage its power on a secondary related market. Furthermore, in cases
where such leverage takes place, it is very rare that the maneuver concerns an entirely new segment where neither the dominant company nor
its rivals have competed before. i 90 It is unnecessary because such a
prong seems to support the misleading assumption that IP-owners are
allowed to monopolize the entire market relating to the item for which IP
protection has been granted. Therefore, antitrust intervention would be
justified only where IP-owners stretch their right to a second different
market from the one they are allegedly entitled to conquer. As the very
ECJ has stated, only in the latter case consumers harm should be
presumed. 191
As I have described above, this assumption is intrinsically wrong as
IP paradigms are not meant to work as a future guarantee for R&D expenditures, nor have IP laws ever been intended to grant monopolies in
an economic sense. Moreover, it would be erroneous to assume that consumer welfare can only be damaged throughout the foreclosure of competition in a secondary market because, as explained above, foreclosure of
competition in the very first market where the IP has been granted is not
a necessary consequence of IP protection.

188. See supra, para. 11.2.1.
189. Supra n. 22, at paras. 237-240. Please note that this position, as lastly restated by
the ECJ in the IMS case, has been eventually adopted by the Commission in the Discussion
Paper on article 82. See DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of
the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, Brussels December 2005,
190. Indeed, the peculiar outcome of the Magill case was determined by the circumstance that the Commission considered the comprehensive TV guide (containing the TV
listing by all broadcasters) as a new product not comprehended in the market for single TV
guide listing.
191. Cf The words used by the ECJ clearly stated that: "in the balancing of the interest
in protection of the intellectual property right and the economic freedom of its owner
against the interest in protection of free competition, the latter can prevail only where
refusal to grant a licence prevents the development of the secondary market to the detriment
of consumers." IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-418/
01, [2004] ECR 1-5039, para. 48.
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The role of consumer welfare

Commentators often agree on the principle held by the First Circuit
that intellectual property and antitrust are complementary policies both
aimed at protecting consumer welfare, as pointed out by the First Circuit
in Data General. This is a very complex assumption, agreeable and disagreeable at the same time. First of all, it is important to stress that IP
laws and competition law have different policy goals which cannot be
easily harmonized with one another. The assertion that both laws are
intended to protect consumer welfare seems a bit of a stretch in this
sense. Indeed, no-one would claim that the goal of competition law and
policy would be the promotion of innovation, as well as no-one would
dare claim that IP laws are aimed at fostering competition. However,
from a broader angle the two sets of laws (IP and antitrust laws) may be
called complementary in that they aim at different but often synergic
objectives.192 The synergy exists insofar as protection of competition and
openness to markets favors and spurs innovation. In this picture, both IP
and competition laws are ultimately aimed at protecting society at large,
hence consumers. However, for the picture to stay still it is important to
acknowledge that the term consumer welfare has different nuances. In
particular, while it is correct to assert that IP laws want to spur creativity and technological process to the benefit of society, it would not be
appropriate to affirm that IP laws wish to protect consumer welfare in
the sense of low prices and increased quantities offered in the market.
The latter, indeed, is not a goal cherished by IP laws. Therefore an assessment of a case at the intersection of IP and competition law which
only measures consumer welfare in terms of price increase would be
poorly examined if it does not evaluate how a likely decision in favor of
an IP-owner is going to affect the innovation process in the long run;
hence, if consumers will actually benefit later on in terms of increased
innovation.
CONCLUSION
The relation between antitrust and intellectual property laws has
always been a complex one. Because intellectual property law grants exclusive rights which may allow, in the short run, for a restriction of competition, some have deemed IPRs to be in sharp contrast with
competition law. Advocates of strong IP protection firmly criticize antitrust intervention into the IP realm, claiming that such intrusion would
undermine the incentive rationale which lies at the core of the IP system.
A similar conclusion has been reached by some other scholars who assert
192. Ghidini & Arezzo, supra n. 164.
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antitrust inaptness to deal and solve the expansionist trend endorsed by
IP in recent years.
Eventually, as seen in this contribution, courts in different countries
have given different interpretation to such tortuous relations. In the
United States courts, with some small exceptions, seem to have accepted
in toto the criticism just outlined. They have elegantly explained that
antitrust and intellectual property laws are complementary legislations
that, in the long run, pursue the very same goal: namely, the protection
of consumer welfare. In practice, however, such "complementary" goals
have resulted, in the United States, in an IPRs' 'immunity' from antitrust intervention. In fact, the presumption created by the First Circuit
in Data General and later reinterpreted by the CAFC in Xerox does not
seem to leave any reasonable room for rebuttal.
The European antitrust agencies have shown a more flexible approach which tries to evaluate the overall circumstances of each single
case. European antitrust authorities analyze whether specific factors existed that put the dominant IP owner in such a position to overexploit
her exclusive right and unduly constrain competition. While the European approach has created growing fears into American companies that
do business in Europe, it is worthwhile stressing that such an approach
is not as far-reaching as it may initially seem. European antitrust analysis of unilateral practices always requires a finding of dominance in the
first place. Moreover, the mere possession of an IPR has never been
judged itself as proof of dominance; while the American Supreme Court
only in 2006 made this principle clear in the case of Illinois Tool Works
Inc. v. Independent Ink Inc. Once dominance has been found, because
the mere refusal to license an IP does not amount itself to an abuse, several prongs must be met to find liability under art. 82 EC Treaty.
It should be pointed out that such a divergence of approaches is also
a consequence of a more generalized difference in the antitrust assessment of unilateral exclusionary conduct in the United States and Europe. Especially with regard to refusals to deal and essential facility
cases, the United States and Europe have shown different attitudes and
ideas of what means are necessary to protect and foster competition. As
shown by the Trinko case, the United States intends to protect competition by preserving a dominant firm's incentives to compete and innovate;
in order to do so, US antitrust authorities think it is necessary not to
force a dominant firm to deal or to license its competitors because they
fear this might reduce its incentives to invest and compete to gain a monopolistic position. Conversely, European competition law has somehow
mitigated that view with the strong idea that a firm who has achieved a
position of dominance in the market must bear a special responsibility
towards the market itself, hence towards its competitors. Such a firm
will not be allowed certain conduct which is permitted to smaller compet-
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itors because its size and overall position of economic and commercial
strength would amplify the effects of such conduct and eventually strangle competition. This view reflects the ideology of the German ordo-liberal school of thought that saw competition law as guarantor of an
undertakings' freedom of action. This view places lots of significance in
the value of openness of markets, as a fundamental condition to favor
competition.
From a mere IP perspective, it should be added that intellectual
property legislations, both American and European, have been framed
with an intrinsic pro-competitive balance. IPRs have self-built safeguard
mechanisms aimed at protecting competitors. Patent law - at least in
theory-restricts the grant of the patent to severe eligibility requirements and circumscribes the scope of protection - again, at least in theory - to what has been precisely discovered and claimed. Hence,
designing room for third parties to invent around the patent. Similarly,
copyright covers only expressions, leaving ideas free to be taken by
others. This room that IPRs envision for rivals to compete in the same
market is vital in that it allows, even in the short run, prices to be driven
down. Therefore, the common assumption that IPRs necessarily restrict
competition and damage consumers by diminishing quantities and increasing prices is true only to a certain extent. Competition by substitution is promoted by the very same IPRs.
In conclusion, IP paradigms vest inventors and creators with a set of
exclusive rights but such rights do not grant absolute control over their
intangible works, nor monopoly power in the economic/antitrust sense.
Conversely, authors are vested with a modicum of market power severely constrained by the presence of substitute products.
Only in some circumstances, where peculiar economic factors (i.a.
network effects) intertwine with IPRs, this market power grows and IP
becomes a potential tool to employ in exclusionary strategies. Indeed, it
often happens in such circumstances that the input covered by IP rights
gains an essential position on the market so that ip-owners, by foreclosing its access, can easily get rid of actual and potential competitors. In
such exceptional cases, antitrust intervention should be welcome because competition is not just restricted but the whole innovative process
risks being hampered.

